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Abstract: Adopted in 1975, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards had 
profound influences on the automobile industry as well as fleet fuel economy in the 
United States. In my dissertation, I first looked into the historical impacts of CAFE 
standards in the automobile industry using vehicle attribute data. I found evidence that 
the increase in the stringency of CAFE standards can induce the innovation of fuel 
economy related technologies in the automobile industry. I further estimated the response 
rate of the induced innovation with respect to stringency increases in CAFE standards. 
Using these estimates, I predicted that automobile companies would be able to meet the 
high 2025 fuel economy target by making medium downsizing in cars and minor 
downsizing in light duty trucks. Such methods can also be applied in other industries that 
have performance based regulations. CAFE standards increased fleet fuel economy in the 
United States as it was designed to. However, a more fuel efficient fleet resulted in less 
gasoline tax revenue, which is the major source of road maintenance. This trend affected 
governments at both federal and state levels. With more stringent CAFE standards 
enforced by the Obama Administration, which seek to almost double vehicle fuel 
economy by 2025, the gasoline tax revenue would be further eroded. As major increases 
 in the gasoline tax rate are not politically feasible in the United States, policy makers seek 
other methods, such as a vehicle mile traveled (VMT) tax, to maintain a more stable 
revenue flow. I estimated households’ driving demand in response to driving cost 
changes using household survey data and estimated tax revenue under different tax 
scenarios. I showed that although a VMT tax can be more regressive than a gasoline tax, 
it provides more stable tax revenue without having to make major adjustments in tax rates 
when fleet fuel economy keeps increasing.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 One of the most important roles of government is to intervene when certain social, 
environmental goals or public goods are necessary but cannot be achieved within a free 
market. Regulations are often used in these cases and sometimes they produce unintended 
outcomes. Some of these unintended outcomes are positive and some are negative. Long 
run impacts, especially when technology advances rapidly, could be very hard for policy 
makers to anticipate when regulations were first designed. To better plan future 
regulations, it is important to study the results of past and exiting regulations to 
understand their full impacts on the society. Assessments of these impacts are key to a 
successful cost and benefit analysis. In my dissertation, I focused on CAFE standards and 
their impacts in the United States, some of which were not fully realized when CAFE 
standards were first introduced. 
 CAFE standards were enacted by the Congress in 1975. At that time, global 
warming was not such a hot topic as it is today. The main reason of adopting CAFE 
standards was to reduce U.S.’s dependence on foreign oil amid the oil crisis in the 1970s. 
It was seen more as a national security issue rather than an environmental issue. The 
 2 
majority of the U.S. public preferred vehicles with large internal spaces and great horse 
power. In the early 1970s, the average fuel economy of cars was only in the vicinity of 
11-12 miles per gallon (MPG). Fuel economy was not systematically tested and in 
publications that introduce vehicle models, such as the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, 
fuel economy was not even listed among vehicle model attributes. There were several 
efficient car models on the market, such as the infamous Ford Pinto, but the majority of 
the consumers did not care much for fuel economy. CAFE standards intervened this 
market by setting MPG standards for both cars and light duty trucks. The National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulates CAFE standards and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for testing the fuel economy of 
new vehicle models. Each automobile company must have their sales weighted average 
fuel economy of all their products, under various brand names, meet the standards in each 
model year. CAFE standards apply to all domestic and foreign automobile companies 
that sell products on the U.S. market. A $551 fine is charged for each MPG per sold 
vehicle that fall below the standards.  
CAFE standards started at 18 MPG for cars in model year 1978 and separate 
standards were set for two wheel drive and four wheel drive trucks in model year 1979, 
which were later replaced by a combined truck standard. The standards were much higher 
than the average fuel economy of vehicles sold in the early 1970s. As a result, automobile 
companies had to downsize their products, which means lowering weight, or lowering 
engine power, or doing both, to gain better fuel economy so that they can meet the 
standards within a short period of time. However, with so many older cars that weigh 
                                                     
1 The fine was raised to $140 starting from model year 2015. 
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over 4,000 lbs. on the road, these new lighter vehicles raised concerns about safety. 
Researches showed that in two vehicle collisions, the greater the difference in vehicle 
weight, the larger chance that the passengers in the lighter vehicle get seriously wounded 
or even getting killed. In the long run, automobile companies had the option of increasing 
the efficiency of their products through technological innovation. The Obama 
Administration pushed for more aggressive CAFE standards as a measure to further cut 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission in the transportation sector. However, given what 
automakers did when CAFE standards were first enacted, the public worried that the new 
stringent standards would trigger another wave of downsizing, which might have 
negative effect on road safety. In chapter two and three, I looked into the historical 
innovation rate under CAFE standards and decomposed innovation rate into natural 
innovation rate and induced innovation rate, which is stimulated by the tightening of 
CAFE standards. There are previous literatures that looked into the effect of regulations 
on innovation. I moved one more step forward and estimated the rate of response of 
technological innovation with respect to the rate of increases in the stringency of CAFE 
standards. I then predicted future innovation rate of automobile companies under the 
upcoming standards using these estimates to examine how much downsizing would 
happen. 
The automobile companies have been regulated by CAFE standards, so it is not 
surprising that their behaviors were deeply influenced. However, CAFE standards also 
have profound effects in other areas. In the United States, the major source of road 
maintenance fund is the gasoline tax revenue. CAFE standards did a great job in making 
vehicles more efficient and thus reduced total gasoline consumption across the country. 
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As a result, gasoline tax revenue had been declining while the road maintenance 
expenditure kept increasing. While expenditure are going up, partly because of inflation, 
it remains extremely hard for the government to raise the gasoline tax. Any idea of 
making major increases in gasoline tax rates would face great pressure from voters in the 
United States. Politicians have been reluctant to touch this issue and would rather seek 
other methods to solve this matter. Take the federal government as an example, the 
current federal gasoline tax rate is 18.4 cents per gallon, which was enacted in 1997. 
Despite all the discussions of global warming and emission cuts, the federal gasoline tax 
rate have not been raised for 19 years and there is still no sign that it would be raised any 
time soon. Local governments have also been facing this difficulty. With more aggressive 
CAFE standards on the way, the erosion in the gasoline tax revenue would only get worse 
in the future.  
Mileage based tax, or a VMT tax was proposed as a replacement for the per 
gallon based gasoline tax in order to provide a more stable revenue for road maintenance. 
Dozens of pilot VMT tax projects were run across the country to study the feasibility of 
this tax and the State of Oregon went further to establish the first VMT tax program in 
2015. In all these programs, global position system (GPS) devices were installed to track 
travel information so that usage fees could be charged accordingly. There have also been 
criticisms about the VMT tax. Some people had privacy concerns about having a GPS 
installed in their vehicle and report to the government of all their travelling behaviors. 
Some questioned the negative incentive a VMT tax would place on purchasing and using 
of highly efficient vehicles, such as hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles. These vehicles, 
designed with new technologies, allow their users to pay little or even no fees under the 
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current gasoline tax. Other challenges include the jurisdictional barriers in tax distribution 
and the high costs in collecting VMT tax, mainly because of the installation of extra 
equipment, and the high transition costs when VMT taxes and gasoline taxes co-exit. 
Obama decided to not to pursue a VMT tax during his term of office. However, as the 
overall fleet fuel economy kept increasing, the government will have to face the hard 
choices between making major increases in gasoline taxes and reforming of taxation.  
In chapter four and five, I used the 2009 National Household Transportation 
Survey data to explore the driving behavior in households nationwide. I estimated the 
annual VMT in households with respect to the cost changes in fuel while taking into 
account the different types of vehicles households possessed. I then simulated the 
changes in driving mileage as well as the tax revenue under different scenarios to 
compare the gasoline tax and the VMT tax.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AUTOMOBILE INNOVATION AND CAFE STANDARDS IN 
THE US 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
According to the EPA estimates, the United States produces around 6,000 
million metric tons of energy-related CO2 emissions every year. As one of the major 
GHG emitters, emission cuts in the United States could have a large impact on the 
global environment. Light duty vehicles, including passenger cars and light duty trucks, 
are one of the major sources of GHG emissions and contribute approximately 20 
percent of the total energy-related GHG emissions in the United States. Not 
surprisingly, various policies have been introduced to reduce emissions and energy 
consumption in this sector. CAFE standards were first enacted in 1975 by the congress. 
The standards target on the sales weighted average2 fuel economy, measured in MPG, 
of automobiles from all automakers that run businesses in the United States. CAFE 
standards were first introduced to passenger cars in model year 1978 and to light duty 
trucks in model year 1979. Though CAFE standards were initially enacted as a response 
                                                     
2 The EPA uses harmonic mean instead of arithmetic mean in calculating CAFE.  
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to the oil crisis in the early 1970s, it is now used as one of the most important 
regulations to control GHG emissions in the United States.  
There are several ways for automakers to meet CAFE standards. Empirical 
studies in engineering show that automakers can sacrifice engine power and vehicle 
weight to get higher fuel economy3 without applying new technologies. That was 
exactly what firms did when CAFE standards first came into effect. As a result, the 
vehicle attributes changed rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Down-weighting 
and lowering engine power are not the only ways firms can improve fuel economy. 
Innovation also allows firms to produce more efficient products without sacrificing 
vehicle performance, which consumers care about the most. Firms can improve the 
thermodynamic efficiency of their engines, lower frictions that include rolling resistance 
and frictions within the mechanical system, and improve aerodynamic designs to gain 
better fuel economy. However, new innovation in these areas needs investment in R&D 
and could take many years to improve and become commercially profitable.   
Previous studies in regulation and innovation show that performance standards 
are capable of inspiring innovation in many industries. In this chapter, I analyze vehicle 
attribute data to answer two related questions. First, how was innovation affected by the 
changes in CAFE standards in the automobile industry in the United States? Second, 
what would happen to innovation under the new standards? I focused on investigating 
the relationship between the rate of innovation related to fuel economy and the changes 
                                                     
3 The energy needed to travel a certain distance (fuel efficiency) is proportionate to the work 
performed by the engine, which is a product of force and distance traveled, dW=F*dS. To lower 
F to get better fuel efficiency, one way for firms to accomplish this quickly is to reduce vehicle 
weight, so that friction between road and wheels could be lowered and, thus, less force is 
needed to move the vehicle. Another fast approach is to lower engine power, which would 
sacrifice acceleration performance of vehicles. Firms can also do both. 
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in CAFE standards. I used a broad definition of innovation in this paper. Following 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942), I considered all successful commercial applications of 
invention, new ideas and designs, and adoption of ideas or technologies from diffusion, 
to be innovation.   
As shown in Figure 2.1, the standard for passenger cars was set at 18 MPG for 
model year 1978, and it kept increasing over the next few years until it hit 27.5 in 1986. 
The 27.5 MPG standard for cars remained stable from 1990 to 20104. Firms made 
dramatic down-weighting in their vehicles and used less powerful engines to meet the 
standards in the late 70s and early 80s. Later, when the standards were stable in the 90s, 
Figure 2.1 CAFE standards over time (MPG).  
 
Note: The truck standard from model year 1979-1981 is the mean of 2WD and 4WD standards. 
Starting from model year 1982 is the combined truck standard. CAFE standards are set based on 
footprint in model year 2012. The large cars/truck and small cars/truck standards show the lower 
and upper bound of the standards. 
                                                     
3 The car standard was lowered to 26 in 1987 and raised back to 27.5 in 1990.  
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firms kept average MPG around the standard and produced heavier and more powerful 
vehicles with new innovations. 
In 2011, President Obama announced new aggressive CAFE standards, which 
seek to almost double the overall fuel economy of passenger vehicles by 2025 compared 
with 2011. The goal was to attain an average MPG of 54.5 in 2025 model year vehicles, 
passenger cars and light duty trucks combined, which is much higher than the 27.4 
MPG in 2011. With such an aggressive shift in CAFE standards, there is an ongoing 
discussion about whether auto makers would provide consumers with much lighter and 
less powerful products, which might further raise safety concerns, similar to what 
happened in the 1970s when CAFE standards first came into effect.  
My work mainly differs from previous literature in two ways. First, while 
previous studies suggested that regulation can indeed speed up innovation, none of them 
were able to quantify the innovation rate with respect to the changes in the stringency of 
standards. I move one step forward and decompose innovation into two parts. One is the 
natural innovation, which occurs regardless of pushes from regulations.  The second 
part is induced innovation, which is in direct response to the tightened standards. 
Therefore, I not only show that changes in regulations can impact innovation, but I also 
show that changes in the rate of innovation is proportional to changes in CAFE 
standards.  
Second, by decomposing innovation and quantifying the response rate of 
induced innovation to the stringency of standards, I turn innovation rate into a function 
of regulation stringency. Using this method, I provide a better tool to predict future 
innovation under new regulations. Instead of picking a vague rate of innovation, such as 
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a mean rate from previous data, I can now adjust the predicted innovation rate based on 
the change in the stringency of upcoming regulations.  
My results suggest that automakers improved their technology over time at a 
natural innovation rate. To be more specific, in the car sector, the natural innovation in 
fuel economy related technologies could increase the fuel economy of cars by 1.19 
percent annually, if vehicle weight and engine power were kept constant. Likewise, in 
the light truck sector, there was a natural innovation rate of 0.67 percent annually. When 
the stringency level of standards changed, automakers also adjusted their innovation 
rates in response to such changes. They were able to innovate faster compared to the 
natural rate when facing pressure from tightened standards. Every one percent increase 
in CAFE standards induced an additional 0.32 percent improvement in total innovation 
in cars. And in the truck sector, every one percent increase in CAFE standards induced 
an additional 0.62 percent in fuel economy-related innovation.   
Using these results, I predict that additional innovation induced by the more 
stringent new standards would play an important role under the new aggressive 
standards. In the car sector, average fuel economy would increase by 41 percent, if 
weight and engine power were kept at 2011 levels. However, such improvements would 
still not be fast enough to meet the 2025 target, so firms will have to downsize their 
products to gain higher MPG. I estimate that cars will have to be downsized5 to the late 
90s’ level to be able to comply with the 2025 standards. In the light truck sector, 
average fuel economy would increase by 45 percent, if weight and engine power 
                                                     
5 Downsizing of vehicles means lowering weight or engine power or both. Firms typically do 
both when they lower engine power to reduce the negative impact on vehicle performance, such 
as acceleration.  
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remained at 2011 levels. Because the standard increase is relatively smaller in the truck 
sector compared to that of the car sector, I estimate that firms will only have to 
downsize their product to the late 2000s’ level to meet the 2025 target. The method I 
use in this chapter can also be applied to other industries where there are performance 
standards whose level of stringency changes over time and have a direct impact on 
innovation.  
 
Literature Review  
 
  There is a rich body of literature about the relationship between regulation and 
innovation. The effect of regulation on innovation varies among different industries and 
among different regulation types. For example, Grabowski and Vernon (1977) found 
that more stringent screening of new drugs would decrease innovation of new drugs in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Thomas (1990) showed that small pharmaceuticals are 
more sensitive to increases in stringency, but large firms are less affected. In the energy 
sector, Popp (2006) found that more stringent U.S. emission standards increased 
domestic innovation in electric utilities. Johnstone et al. (2008) examined various 
economic regulations on renewable energy in OECD countries, and the results varied 
across different types of energy sources. In the automobile sector, most evidence 
showed positive effects of regulation on innovation. Atkinson and Garner (1987) found 
positive impacts on innovation from the introduction of stringent emission standards in 
1970, CAFE standards in 19756, and the stringent safety standards in 1967.   
                                                     
6 CAFE standards were enacted by Congress in 1975 and took effect in model year 1978.  
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   Although patent data are used widely as a measure of knowledge stock in 
studying innovation, product attributes can also be used as an index of innovation. 
Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins (1999) built “characteristics transformation surface” using 
attributes of air-conditioners to study the relation between technology growth and trade-
offs between energy usage and performance in energy-consuming products. They found 
that energy efficiency, directed innovation responded substantially after the initiation of 
energy-efficient product labeling, such as energy star, was required. To apply the idea 
of “characteristics transformation surface” to other products, it is important that the 
attributes of the product are indeed transferable to each other. Empirical studies of 
automobiles support such a relationship among vehicle weight, fuel economy, and 
engine power. For example, Murrell (1999) estimated that each percent increase in 0–60 
MPH time (i.e., slower acceleration performance7) implied a 0.44 percent improvement 
in a fleet’s average fuel economy.   
  Following the same idea of “characteristics transformation surface” in Newell, 
Jaffe, and Stavins (1999), Knittel (2011) studied the trade-off between light duty vehicle 
attributes including MPG, weight, and engine power under the pressure of CAFE 
standards. He then estimated the rate of shift of this surface over time and, thus, 
estimated the rate of innovation over time. He predicted that if weight, horsepower, and 
torque were fixed at their 1980 levels, MPG could have risen by 60 percent from 1980 
to 2006. Also, to meet with Obama’s aggressive CAFE standards will require major 
downsizing of vehicles. Using the same framework, Klier and Linn (2013) reported that 
                                                     
7 Acceleration rate is a function of vehicle weight, and torque, which is one measure of the power 
of an engine.  
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increases in CAFE standards in the truck sector had a positive impact on innovation. 
These empirical results are supportive of using vehicle attributes to model innovation.  
   An enormous amount of work has been done studying the effects of CAFE 
standards. Other than Knittel (2011) and Klier et al. (2013) mentioned above, Goldberg 
(1998) showed that firms would have produced cars with lower MPG had the CAFE 
standards not been in place. Because firms were taking corner solutions in their MPG 
choice when CAFE standards were effective and binding, there was no incentive for 
firms to develop vehicles with better MPG. Instead, firms produced more small cars and 
less large cars to make sure the average MPG met the standards. This could be the 
explanation of the almost flat average MPG after 1983, when CAFE standards remained 
stable. Lutsey and Sperling (2005) also pointed out that vehicles became heavier and 
more powerful when the CAFE standards stopped increasing and, as a result, MPG 
remained unimproved. They treated the increase in weight and power while MPG 
remained stable as evidence of technological improvements that were directed to 
personal interests instead of pubic interests, such as fuel economy.    
  Whether CAFE standards made vehicles unsafe is also a viable topic. Greene 
(1998) concluded that CAFE standards had achieved their goal at a small cost. He 
argued that the previous concerns about safety, rebound effect, and consumer surplus 
were either minor or had not materialized. However, he also agreed that although the 
standards could be raised further, the regulator must give automakers enough time to 
adjust and improve their technologies to mitigate potential cost. Ahmad and Greene 
(2005) focused on the highway fatality rate from 1966 to 2002 and average fuel 
economy of vehicles during the same period. Their results suggested a negative 
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relationship between average fuel economy and the fatality rate from automobile 
accidents. They argued that such a relationship does not support the assertion that 
CAFE standards were making driving less safe.  
  Scholars also predicted future vehicle attributes under CAFE standards. Besides 
Knittel (2011), DeCicco and Ross (2001) estimated that by 2010-2015, there could be a 
47 percent increase in overall MPG from 24 to 35 with a reduction in curb weight of 14 
percent compared to the 2000 level.  
The overall MPG could even reach 44 with a reduction in curb weight of 26 percent 
compared with the 2000 level. Such predictions are important for policy makers in 
designing future CAFE standards, as they provide more information of potential social 
costs.   
 
 
Theoretical and empirical models  
 
In this part of the research, my focus is on the relationship between innovation 
and changes in CAFE standards. Following Knittel’s (2011) vehicle attribute surface 
framework, I modelled innovation under CAFE standards as follows. Firms choose the 
attributes of their products, including engine power (hpit), torque (tqit), curb weight (wit), 
fuel economy (mpgit), other attributes that are related to fuel economy (Xit), and 
attributes related to other aspects (Yit), at time t given the profitable technologies 
available at time t. I represent it as:  
(1) Kit=f(mpgit, wit, hpit, tqit, Xit, Yit, t)  
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The purpose of this study  was to estimate innovation that  was  related to 
fuel economy,  which included innovation that affects fuel economy directly, and 
innovation that affected other vehicle attributes that are transferable to fuel economy, 
such as weight and engine power. I assumed that K was additively separable in 
attributes related to fuel economy and in attributes that were not related to fuel 
economy, that is  
(2) Kit=Ut(mpgit, wit, hpit, tqit, Xit)+D(Yit, t),  
where U is the level of profitable technologies that are related to fuel economy available 
at time t, and D is the level of technologies that are unrelated to fuel economy, such as 
safety, available at time t. My focus is on the progress of the level of U over time and 
the level set of U can be expressed as  
(3) MPGit=g(Wit, HPit, TQit, Xit|Ut)  
Following Knittel (2011), I assume the Cobb-Douglas functional form in U. 
Then the fuel economy is modeled as  
(4) lnMPGit= β1lnWit+β2lnHPit+ β3lnTQit +β4Mt + β5Mt*t +X’itB+eit ,  
where M is the dummy of having a manual transmission, X includes a set of dummies 
of fuel type and a turbo-charged engine, which could also affect performance of fuel 
economy.   
After building the level set of U, the next step is to model the change in the level 
of U over time. I model the level of U at year t with respect to year t-1 as  
(5) Ut/Ut-1=(St/St-1)mEXP(j+εt),  
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where S is the fuel economy standard, m is the innovation rate that is induced by 
standard changes, j is the average annual innovation rate, and ε is a normally 
distributed, zero mean error term, which represents fluctuation in the annual innovation 
under natural growth. I assumed independency of ε in different model years. Then, in 
each model year after CAFE was enacted, I have  
(6) Ut/U0=(St/S0)mEXP(t*j+∑εt)  
Finally, I have my empirical model of innovation that is related to fuel economy as  
(7) lnMpgit= β1lnWit+β2lnHPit+ β3lnTQit+j*t+ m*lnSt+ β4Mt + β5Mt*t 
+X’itB+eit  
  
 
Data  
 
I tallied attributes of vehicle models that were sold in the U.S. market from 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (WAY) from 1975 to 2011 and automobile-catalog.com 
(AC) from 1975 to 2011. Both datasets have their advantages and disadvantages. WAY 
covers a broader range of vehicles among 68 different makes. However, WAY does not 
provide complete information on torque in cars prior to 1997. Fuel type is also not 
reported directly in WAY. Therefore, I constructed the fuel type of internal combustion 
engine vehicles from the compression ratio reported in WAY. I assigned fuel type as 
gasoline if the compression ratio of the engine was less than 12, and I assigned fuel type 
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as diesel if the compression ratio was above 128. I also constructed the transmission 
type for earlier years in WAY9, when several transmissions were reported for the same 
trim10. I chose only the first recorded transmission as the standard transmission to 
determine whether the trim was transmitted manually or automatically.   
In the WAY data, the MPG reported were the EPA-adjusted MPG ratings. The 
EPA changed their method for estimating MPG ratings over time. Also, only the 
combined adjusted MPG rating was reported before 1985. Starting in 1985, adjusted 
MPGs were reported in two separate numbers, city MPG and highway MPG. The city 
MPG was calculated as 0.9*[EPA tested city MPG] and highway MPG was calculated 
as 0.78*[EPA tested highway MPG].   
In 2008, the EPA adjusted their MPG rating method again. The new method 
took more variables, such as outdoor temperature and air-conditioning, into account. 
This change resulted in a decrease in EPA-adjusted MPG in most vehicles. The new 
formulas are shown as below  
  
                                                     
8 Diesel engines require a high compression ratio to trigger combustion.  
9 More recent data report the standard transmission of the trim and list other transmissions that 
are available to consumers as options.  
10 Trims are more detailed settings within models. For example, 2011 Ford Taurus is a model, 
2011 Ford Taurus SE and 2011 Ford Taurus SEL are different trims of the same model.  
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I used these formulas, provided by the EPA, and the adjusted MPG to reverse engineer 
and calculate the tested MPG and then I applied the formulas used prior to 2008 to get 
adjusted MPG numbers that were comparable to those of previous model years. I then 
applied the same method that the EPA used to construct the combined MPG, which was 
the weighted, harmonic mean of adjusted city MPG and adjusted highway MPG using a 
city/highway ratio of 0.55/0.45. I added a dummy into the regression specifications to 
control for the difference between combined fuel economy from the WAY data and 
from the AC data. I did this because MPG reported in the AC data was estimated by 
European engineers, and was not tested and calculated using EPA methods.  
The AC data that I had permission to use covered 23 major makes, but provided 
more comprehensive information in vehicle MPG and torque. The AC data also 
provided full information about transmission types and fuel types for all trims. The 
MPG reported in the AC data were not EPA ratings, but estimates made by engineers.   
Vehicles that have a gross weight above 8500 lbs., typically heavy duty trucks, 
are not regulated by CAFE standards, therefore, I removed these vehicles from my 
analysis. I also removed from my analysis hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles that 
have MPGs above 70, because these vehicles use very different technologies; the 
empirical model for internal combustion engine vehicles might not be suitable for 
estimating innovation and for reflecting attribute tradeoffs in these vehicles.  
 
Evidence of attribute tradeoffs and technological progress  
 
The fuel economy of vehicle models changed dramatically after CAFE standards 
were enacted. Figure 2.1 shows the changes in CAFE standards over time. The 
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standards went into effect in 1978 for cars and in 1979 for trucks. The standards 
increased sharply at the beginning and then remained stable in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
car standards remained stable until 2011, but the truck standards started to increase 
again after model year 2004. The Obama administration set aggressive new standards, 
and these new standards after the 2011 model year will be based on the footprints11 of 
vehicles.   
Figure 2.2 shows how the average weight, horsepower, and fuel economy 
changed from 1975 to 2011. Compared to passenger cars in model year 1975, average 
MPG almost doubled in 1986 and remained at stable until 2011. Average horsepower  
 
Figure 2.2. Changes in main car attributes from 1975 to 2011.  
 
Note: The mean MPG, horsepower and weight of all car models in model year 1975 were set as 
the baseline and I report the percentage changes of the means of these attributes. 
decreased by over 20 percent in 1982 compared to 1975 models, and then horsepower 
kept increasing annually; in 2011 it was 90 percent higher than that of 1975 models.  
                                                     
11 Footprint is calculated as vehicle width times length of wheelbase.  
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Similarly, average curb weight of cars decreased sharply during the period when CAFE 
standards were increasing. Average weight decreased by 25 percent from model year 
1975 to 1986, and then increased gradually and almost returned to the 1975 level in 
2011.  
I observed a similar trend in the light duty truck sector, where CAFE standards 
were first introduced at 17.2 MPG for two-wheel drive (2WD) trucks and 15.8 MPG for 
four-wheel drive (4WD) trucks. The separate standards for 2WD trucks and 4WD trucks 
were disconnected after 1992. A combined standard was introduced later in 1982 at 17.5 
MPG and all standards kept increasing till 198712, when the combined standard was at 
20.5 MPG. The combined standard approximated 20.5 for a few years and remained 
stable at 20.7 MPG from 1996 to 2004. The truck standards increased slowly again in 
2005 and kept increasing to 24.1 in 2011. During the 1975-2011 model years, average 
weight of light trucks also dropped sharply in the early years when the standards came 
into effect, and then in 2011they increased to 20 percent higher than the 1975 level.  
Average horsepower decreased slightly at the beginning and then increased to 110 
percent higher than the 1975 level during the same period.  
These data show that, first, when standards increased faster than the innovation 
rate in the industry, firms were capable of lowering the weight and horsepower of their 
products to gain better fuel economy. The changes in average weight, horsepower, and 
MPG during the late 70s and early 80s reflected such behavior, and these changes were 
consistent with empirical findings in engineering that weight, engine power, and fuel 
                                                     
12 Firms were allowed to choose to comply with the combined truck standard or the separate 
standards for 2WD and 4WD trucks from 1982 to 1992. Most firms chose to comply with the 
combined standards.  
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economy are transferable to each other. Second, as technologies advance over time, 
firms are capable of building vehicles that are better in every dimension. The changes  
in average horsepower and weight during the period when CAFE standards were stable 
show that innovation over time allows firms to build vehicles with similar MPG, but are 
much more powerful and heavier. Because horsepower and weight can be transferred to 
MPG, such changes suggest that firms should be able to build vehicles that are more 
fuel-efficient over time if they keep weight and engine power stable. Not surprisingly, 
firms were able to produce cars that were heavier and more efficient in 2008 compared 
to 1978 (Fig. 2.3). Such a shift in the plotting of attributes can be seen also in engine 
power and fuel economy, and this is clear evidence of innovation.   
  
Figure 2.3 Technological innovation of cars from 1978 to 2008. 
 
Note: The technology level is the quadratic fitted line of vehicle weight and MPG of the 
corresponding model year.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE IMPACT OF CAFE STANDARDS ON INNOVATION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the regression results of the model discussed in chapter 
two and discuss the intuition behind these results. I then predict future technology 
progress under the new aggressive CAFE standards using my findings. 
 
 
Empirical results  
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the regression results of passenger cars and tables 3.3 
and 3.4 report the regression results of light duty trucks. Tables 3.1 and 3.3 also provide 
comparisons between firms from different origins, and tables 3.2 and 3.4 compare 
among different vehicle classes.  
 
 
 25 
Trade-offs among vehicle attributes  
 
Coefficients of engine power, which is measured by torque, horsepower, and 
weight suggest that they are correlated negatively to fuel economy. This is consistent 
with empirical studies in engineering, which emphasize that weight or engine power can 
be lowered to gain higher MPG. Vehicles using diesel engines usually have better fuel 
economy compared to vehicles using gasoline engines due to the higher efficiency of  
 
Table 3.1. Innovation response to CAFE standards in cars (1978-2011).  
 All  US  Asian  EU  
Log horsepower  -0.1378  0.0492  -0.4781***  -0.6089  
   (0.0732)  (0.0389)  (0.1063)  (0.0977)  
Log curb weight  -0.3770***  -0.2848***  -0.3061***  -0.3802***  
   (0.0355)  (0.0331)  (0.0728)  (0.0423)  
Log torque  -0.3533***  -0.5881***  -0.0245  0.2657***  
   (0.0841)  (0.0388)  (0.1320)  (0.1072)  
Manual  0.1341***  0.1157***  0.0954***  0.1142***  
   (0.0186)  (0.0214)  (0.0196)  (0.0543)  
Manual*trend  -0.0067***  -0.0051***  -0.0047***  -0.0043***  
   (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0021)  
Diesel fuel  0.1637***  0.1340***  0.1999***  0.1362***  
   (0.0537)  (0.0185)  (0.0814)  (0.0298)  
Turbocharged  0.1430***  0.1405***  0.1235***  0.0213***  
   (0.0161)  (0.0250)  (0.0201)  (0.0227)  
Wards  0.3977***  0.4147***  0.3360***  0.4147***  
   (0.0141)  (0.0115)  (0.0210)  (0.0234)  
Log CAFE standards  0.3205***  0.3089***  0.4225***  -0.2012  
   (0.0353)  (0.0388)  (0.0799)  (0.1366)  
Yearly trend  0.0119***  0.0079***  0.0130***  0.0129***  
   (0.0013)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0011)  
 Firm fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  Y  
 R-squared  0.8971  0.9181  0.8553  0.7637  
 Obs  21,656  12,870  5,501  3,066  
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. I compared the results among automakers with 
different countries of origins. 
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diesel engines. Another important factor that affects fuel economy is the type of 
transmission. Manually-transmitted vehicles are normally more fuel efficient than 
automatically-transmitted vehicles of the same model. However, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms of manual transmission and the time trend show that the difference had 
been decreasing over time for both cars and trucks. In fact, vehicles with some of the  
 
Table 3.2. Comparison of innovation responses among car classes.  
 
Small cars Medium Cars Large cars Economy cars Luxury cars 
Log horsepower  -0.2300*** 
(0.0948)  
-0.1275***  0.0722  -0.0867  -0.2597***  
   (0.0547)  (0.0561)  (0.0651)  (0.1269)  
Log curb weight  -0.2994***  -0.4589***  -0.4882***  -0.3788***  -0.2921***  
   (0.0563)  (0.0713)  (0.0926)  (0.0460)  (0.0565)  
Log torque  -0.2808***  -0.3734***  -0.4676***  -0.4253***  -0.1954  
   (0.1162)  (0.0519)  (0.0859)  (0.0650)  (0.1299)  
Manual  0.1389***  0.1014***  0.0385  0.1300***  0.0831***  
   (0.0132)  (0.0390)  (0.0178)  (0.0157)  (0.0445)  
Manual*trend  -0.0061***  
(0.0006)  
0.2490***  
-0.0049***  -0.0001***  -0.0063***  -0.0040***  
   (0.0016)  (0.0008)  (0.0005)  (0.0017)  
Diesel fuel  0.0735  0.2197***  0.2118***  0.0566  
   (0.0523)  (0.0474)  (0.0185)  (0.0688)  (0.0679)  
Turbocharged  0.1271***  0.1916***  0.2609***  0.0895***  0.1331***  
   (0.0155)  (0.0182)  (0.0211)  (0.0237)  (0.0348)  
Wards  0.3543***  0.4041***  0.5065***  0.3538***  0.4833***  
   (0.0171)  (0.0131)  (0.0104)  (0.0133)  (0.0253)  
Log CAFE standards  0.3456***  0.3058***  0.3101***  0.2695***  0.4373***  
   (0.0575)  (0.0594)  (0.1496)  (0.0382)  (0.1246)  
Yearly trend  0.0129***  0.0117***  0.0052***  0.0123***  0.0101***  
   (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0020)  (0.0012)  (0.0026)  
 Firm fixed effect  Y Y Y Y Y 
 R-squared  0.8609 0.8901 0.9336 0.9325 0.7971 
 Obs  10185 8525 2946 16287 5369 
   
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. I compared results among car classes following 
definitions in Ward’s Automotive Yearbook.  
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modern automatic transmissions, such as the Continuously Variable Transmission (CVT), 
have similar or even better performance in fuel efficiency compared to vehicles with 
manual transmissions.   
 
Table 3.3. Innovation responses to CAFE standards in trucks (1979-2011).  
  All US Asian EU 
Log horsepower 0.0589 0.0927 0.0253 -0.0946 
  (0.0431) (0.0711) (0.0716) (0.0894) 
Log curb weight -0.3975*** -0.3797*** -0.4283*** -0.5554*** 
  (0.0295) (0.0507) (0.0412) (0.0737) 
Log torque -0.4318*** -0.4788*** -0.3781*** -0.1819 
  (0.0642) (0.1050) (0.0761) (0.1146) 
Manual 0.0783*** 0.0855*** -0.0439*** -0.0174*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0191) (0.0415) (0.0433) 
Manual*trend -0.0043*** -0.0045*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 
  (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
Diesel fuel 0.3468*** 0.3452*** 0.4524*** 0.3051*** 
  (0.0695) (0.0991) (0.0213) (0.0540) 
Turbocharged 0.1043***   0.0648*** 0.0743*** 
  (0.0182)   (0.0141) (0.0277) 
Wards 0.4070*** 0.4259*** 0.3390*** 0.3699*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0161) (0.0198) (0.0339) 
Log CAFE standards 0.6239*** 0.6306*** 0.4530*** 1.1270*** 
  (0.1966) (0.3151) (0.1492) (0.3600) 
Yearly trend 0.0066*** 0.0056*** 0.0086*** 0.0046 
  (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.865 0.8612 0.8145 0.9191 
Obs 14724 10369 3775 566 
     
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. I compared the results among automakers with 
different countries of origins. 
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Table 3.4. Comparison in innovations among truck classes.  
  Pickups CUV/SUV Vans 
Log horsepower -0.0270 0.0818 0.0498 
  (0.0241) (0.0853) (0.0413) 
Log curb weight -0.2808*** -0.4397*** -0.7404*** 
  (0.0195) (0.0244) (0.0403) 
Log torque -0.2736*** -0.4617*** -0.2448*** 
  (0.0358) (0.0843) (0.0232) 
Manual 0.0492 0.0939 0.2152 
  (0.0275) (0.0117) (0.0358) 
Manual*trend -0.0027*** -0.0040*** -0.0084*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0021) 
Diesel fuel 0.3086*** 0.3818***   
  (0.0238) (0.0790)   
Turbocharged 0.0259*** 0.1341***   
  (0.0086) (0.0145)   
wards 0.3768*** 0.4129*** 0.3337*** 
  (0.0235) (0.0163) (0.0203) 
Log CAFE standards 0.8959*** 0.4719*** 0.3913*** 
  (0.0448) (0.1726) (0.1257) 
Yearly trend 0.0009 0.0088*** 0.0065*** 
  (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0018) 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.7782 0.8904 0.8145 
Obs 4267 8748 3775 
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. I compared results among truck classes following 
definitions in Ward’s Automotive Yearbook.  
 
Natural rate of innovation  
 
The coefficients of year trend estimate the average annual growth rate of fuel 
economy related technologies. My results suggested that on average, firms had an 
annual innovation of 1.19 percent in the fuel economy of their passenger cars. Note that 
this is not saying the actual fuel economy of new car models increased every year. The 
interpretation is that the natural innovation allowed firms to increase the fuel economy 
by 1.19 percent, assuming that other vehicle attributes, including engine power and 
weight, were kept constant. Firms could also increase weight or engine power instead of 
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fuel economy to make their product more attractive to their customers. That is exactly 
what they did when CAFE standards were stable. Similarly, in the light duty truck 
sector, the natural innovation rate was 0.66 percent annually. These estimates are the 
average innovation rate for all firms. As shown in tables 3.1 to 3.4, innovation rate 
varied across firms from different countries and different vehicle classes. For example, 
while the U.S. automakers had annual innovation rates at 0.79 percent in cars and 0.56 
percent in trucks, Asian automakers had annual innovation rates at 1.3 percent in cars 
and 0.86 percent in trucks. Also, small cars appeared to enjoy a higher innovation rate 
than large cars, and SUV/CUVs led in innovation rate among trucks.  
 
Innovation in response to CAFE standards 
  
Induced innovation is the key focus of this paper. My results showed that in both 
the passenger car and light truck markets, the changes in the level of CAFE standards 
had a significant effect on the fuel economy-related innovation in addition to the natural 
innovation rate. Also, the truck sector responded more strongly than the car sector.  
The coefficients of the log of CAFE standards estimate the average induced 
innovation with respect to changes in CAFE standards. The estimates suggested that on 
average, a one percent increase in CAFE standards was associated with an additional 
0.32 percent point increase in the innovation of fuel economy-related technologies of 
cars. Likewise, a one percent increase in CAFE standards was associated with an 
additional 0.62 percent point increase in the innovation for trucks. There are two 
explanations for the different responses for cars and trucks to the changes in CAFE 
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standards. The first is that light duty trucks started at a relatively low technology level. 
When CAFE standards first came into effect, the market share of light duty trucks was 
merely 20 percent of the passenger vehicle market and there were very few international 
brands on the U.S. market. The market for cars, however, was much more mature and 
competitive. The second reason is that, as discussed in part B, the natural innovation 
rate of trucks was lower than that for cars. Therefore, being a relatively young product 
with low natural innovation, light duty trucks had more room for improvement when 
pushed by the increased standards.     
I also broke down the data into various subgroups to explore the heterogeneity 
among different automakers and vehicle classes. As shown in table 3.1, in the passenger 
car market, both U.S. automakers and Asian automakers responded strongly to CAFE 
standards. This is surprising at first glance, because Asian makers had been producing 
cars with an average fuel economy that was well above CAFE standards. Small 
increases in CAFE standards should not have had a direct influence on the Asian 
makers. I explain this as evidence of market competition. U.S. automakers had been 
producing cars with an average fuel economy that barely met CAFE standards. Every 
time CAFE standards tightened up, U.S. automakers had to push harder in their 
innovation to increase their fuel economy to meet the higher standards. They were 
reluctant to simply lower weight and engine power, because these attributes were what 
consumers demanded in the United States. The traditional advantage of Asian cars had 
been fuel economy since the day they entered the U.S. market. To protect their 
advantages in the competitive market, Asian makers also had to increase fuel efficiency 
of their products when U.S. automakers improved theirs under the impetus of CAFE 
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standards. Therefore, though most of the time the tightening in CAFE standards did not 
affect Asian automakers directly, the tougher standards still stimulated a faster 
innovation rate for Asian brand cars because of market competition.   
There were also automakers that chose not to comply with CAFE standards and, 
instead, paid the fines. These were all European companies who specialized in 
producing luxury cars. Unlike U.S. and Asian automakers, European automakers did not 
show a significant response in innovation to the increases in CAFE standards. I explain 
this as the evidence that these European companies were able to pass down the fines to 
their consumers who cared more about the luxury features of their vehicles and who 
were less sensitive to prices. I did not observe such behavior in the luxury cars of U.S. 
and Asian automakers. There are two explanations for this. First, even though they were 
all luxury vehicles, U.S. and Asian luxury cars were usually less expensive than 
European luxury cars, which suggests that consumers who chose to purchase European 
luxury cars were probably richer and less price-sensitive than those who chose U.S. or 
Asian luxury cars. Second, U.S. and Asian automakers pushed their innovation in 
response to the increases in CAFE standards to either avoid paying fines or to maintain 
a market advantage. Most of these innovations could have been applied to both 
economy cars and luxury cars without extra costs. As a result, even though consumers 
of luxury cars may have been less price-sensitive, U.S. and Asian automakers did not 
apply significantly different compliance strategies for their economy cars and luxury 
cars.  
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Robustness checks  
  
 In this section, I discuss the potential concerns with the robustness of the results, 
and I perform a series of robustness checks to show that the estimates of the main 
results are sound.   
Correlation between vehicle attributes  
 
The first concern of the empirical model I used is that vehicle attributes were 
correlated with each other. When automakers design their vehicles, the combinations of 
installed equipment are not random. For example, engine power is highly correlated 
with vehicle weight. Automakers typically install more powerful engines in heavier and 
larger vehicles. Therefore, horsepower and weight are clearly correlated with each 
other. Though the focus of this paper is not on the tradeoff between attributes, but on the 
innovation rate, I still wanted to ensure that such correlations among attributes would 
not bias the estimation of innovation responses. To address this concern, I used the 
translog functional form instead of the Cobb-Douglas functional form in the technology 
level U. By introducing interaction terms between key vehicle attributes, I tested 
whether my estimates of innovation responses were sensitive to such correlations. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the regression results using the translog functional form in 
specification III, and the main specification is shown in specification II.  
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Table 3.5. Comparison of Innovation response in cars among different specifications.  
  Spec I  Spec II  Spec III  
Log horsepower  -0.4122***  -0.1378*** -1.0728*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0732) (1.3998) 
Log horsepower squared        -0.4933*** 
         (0.0875) 
Log horsepower*Log weight        0.0195 
         (0.1733) 
Log horsepower*Log torque        1.0932*** 
         (0.1607) 
Log curb weight  -0.5840***  -0.3770***  5.8616***  
   -(0.0311) -(0.0355) (1.4723) 
Log weight squared        -0.5143*** 
         (0.1320) 
Log weight*Log torque        0.3847 
         (0.2608) 
Log torque     -0.3533***  -2.2422*** 
      (0.0841) (1.8252) 
Log torque squared        -0.6405***  
         (0.1297) 
Manual  0.1490***  0.1341***  0.1122***  
   (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0197) 
Manual*trend  -0.0074***  -0.0067***  -0.0050***  
   (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Diesel fuel  0.1122***  0.1637***  0.2129***  
   (0.0501) (0.0537) (0.0521) 
Turbocharged  0.1235***  0.1430***  0.1232***  
   (0.0268) (0.0161) (0.0186) 
wards  0.3983***  0.3977***  0.3921***  
   (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0139) 
Log CAFE standards  0.3792***  0.3205***  0.2243***  
   (0.0289) (0.0353) (0.0353) 
Yearly trend  0.0157***  0.0119***  0.0119***  
  (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Firm fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  
R-squared  0.8883 0.8971 0.9036 
Obs  21656 21656 21656 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. Spec I and II use the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
of technology level and Spec I removes torque from regression. Spec III uses the translog 
functional form assumption.  
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Table 3.6. Comparison of Innovation response in trucks among different specifications.  
  Spec I  Spec II  Spec III  
Log horsepower  -0.2806***  0.0589 -0.0579 
 (0.0215) -(0.0431) -(1.0173) 
Log horsepower squared        -0.2200*** 
         (0.0959) 
Log horsepower*Log weight        0.1241 
         -(0.2097) 
Log horsepower*Log torque        0.2585 
         -(0.2780) 
Log curb weight  -0.5980***  -0.3975***  2.8153***  
   -(0.0184) -(0.0295) -(1.2335) 
Log weight squared        -0.1609 
         -(0.1096) 
Log weight*Log torque        -0.2202 
         -(0.2940) 
Log torque     -0.4318***  -1.7171 
      -(0.0642) -(1.3189) 
Log torque squared        0.1617 
         -(0.2392) 
Manual  0.0825***  0.0783***  0.0841***  
   -(0.0226) -(0.0133) -(0.0110) 
Manual*trend  -0.0049***  -0.0043***  -0.0047***  
   -(0.0012) -(0.0007) -(0.0005) 
Diesel fuel  0.2309***  0.3468***  0.3315***  
   -(0.0594) -(0.0695) -(0.0608) 
Turbocharged  0.0397***  0.1043***  0.0381 
   -(0.0107) -(0.0182) -(0.0234) 
wards  0.3982***  0.4070***  0.4061***  
   -(0.0130) -(0.0136) -(0.0141) 
Log CAFE standards  0.8299***  0.6239***  0.6115***  
   -(0.1295) -(0.1966) -(0.2003) 
Yearly trend  0.0107***  0.0066***  0.0064***  
  -(0.0017) -(0.0015) -(0.0018) 
Firm fixed effect  Y  Y  Y  
R-squared  0.8385 0.865 0.8697 
Obs  14726 14724 14724 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. Spec I and II use the Cobb-Douglas functional form of 
technology level and Spec I removes torque from regression. Spec III uses the translog functional 
form assumption. 
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The annual innovation rate estimated using the translog model was almost 
identical to the estimates I obtained in the Cobb-Douglas model. The response rates of 
innovation to the changes in CAFE standards were also very close between the two 
specifications. Such results suggested that even though there are correlations among 
vehicle attributes, they did not appear to be a potential threat to the estimations of 
annual innovation rates and the response rates of innovation to standards. 
Engine power measurement  
 
The second concern I had was the measure of engine power. I used both highest 
torque and highest horsepower in the analysis. However, these two measures were also 
related closely. I show the specification keeping only horsepower in specification I and 
the estimates of natural innovation rate and response rate increased slightly compared to 
the main specification, which included both maximum torque and horsepower. The 
relationship between torque and horsepower is: Horsepower=Revolution per minute 
(rpm)*Torque/5252; and torque is a function of rpm. So, although these variables were 
highly correlated, keeping both maximum horsepower and maximum torque in the 
model still helped to control for more features of engine development over time. 
Therefore, I still chose the more conservative estimates in the main specification to 
predict future innovation.   
Firm responses during different time periods  
 
To predict automakers’ future response to new CAFE standards, one important 
assumption I had to make is that firms would respond similarly to what they had done in 
the past. To test whether this was a reasonable assumption, I analyzed whether there 
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were significant changes among firms’ responses in the earlier years compared to more 
recent years. In the car fleet, CAFE standards were stable from 1990 to 2010 and only 
started to increase again in 2011. Therefore, I have little available information to make 
the comparison. In the truck fleet, however, CAFE standards were stable from 1996 to 
2004, which allowed me to compare whether firms behaved differently prior to 1996 
and after 2004. I compared the response rates in two different time windows for the 
truck fleet. The first response rate was from 1979 to 2004, which included the period 
when CAFE standards became effective and were being adjusted every year13 (1979 to 
1995), and the period when the standards were stable (1996 to 2004). The second 
window contained the stable period and the more recent period when CAFE standards 
started to increase again (2005 to 2011).   
Table 3.7 reports the comparison between the two time windows and the results 
suggest that in both time windows, firms responded similarly to the changes in the 
standards. In the earlier period, the response rate was 0.727, and in the more recent 
years, the response rate was 0.604. The response rate was slightly higher in the earlier 
years, but the difference between the response rates during these two periods was not 
statistically significant.  These results demonstrate that firms’ response to changes in 
standards did not change dramatically during the past 30 years. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that automakers would still be able to respond similarly to what 
they had done before. This supports the idea that it is reasonable to use previous 
innovation behavior as a reference in predicting future innovation. 
 
                                                     
13 CAFE standards did not increase monotonically in the earlier years; for example, the 
standards for trucks were lowered in model year 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992.  
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Table 3.7. Earlier year versus recent responses to CAFE standards in the truck sector.  
 1979-2011 1979-2004 1996-2011 
Log horsepower 0.0589 0.0043 -0.0187 
  (0.0431) (0.0436) (0.0311) 
Log curb weight -0.3975*** -0.3985*** -0.4243*** 
  (0.0295) (0.0518) (0.0322) 
Log torque -0.4318*** -0.4043*** -0.3295*** 
  (0.0642) (0.0869) (0.0263) 
Manual 0.0783*** 0.1064*** 0.0481 
  (0.0133) (0.0079) (0.0503) 
Manual*trend -0.0043*** -0.0056*** -0.0033 
  (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0020) 
Diesel fuel 0.3468*** 0.2521*** 0.3332*** 
  (0.0695) (0.0582) (0.0495) 
Turbocharged 0.1043*** 0.1591*** 0.0822*** 
  (0.0182) (0.0270) (0.0134) 
wards 0.4070*** 0.3565*** 0.4026*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0232) (0.0159) 
Log CAFE standards 0.6239*** 0.7269*** 0.6042*** 
  (0.1966) (0.1646) (0.1450) 
Yearly trend 0.0066*** 0.0111*** 0.0074*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0009) 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.865 0.8854 0.8549 
Obs 14724 7800 12025 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. 1979-2011 represents the complete period of analysis 
of this paper. 1979-2004 includes the time when CAFE standards for trucks were actively 
increasing after it took effect and the period when the standards kept stable. 1996-2011 includes 
the period when the truck standards were stable and the period when truck standards started to 
increase again. 
 
The role of gasoline prices 
   
Vehicle usage are highly relevant to the cost of gasoline. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that one might expect a close relationship between the gasoline prices and the 
fuel economy related innovations. I incorporated the historical gasoline prices into the 
model to test whether fluctuations in gasoline prices have any effect on innovation.  
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Table 3.8. Role of real gasoline prices in vehicle innovation responses.  
    
   Cars 1978-2011 Trucks 1979-2011 
  Spec II Spec IV Spec V Spec II Spec IV Spec V 
Log horsepower -0.1378 -0.1441*** -0.1402 0.0589 0.0546 0.0534 
  (0.0732) (0.0725) (0.0720) (0.0431) (0.0400) (0.0391) 
Log curb weight -0.3770*** -0.3761*** -0.3769*** -0.3975*** -0.3893*** -0.3934*** 
  (0.0355) (0.0360) (0.0357) (0.0295) (0.0325) (0.0328) 
Log torque -0.3533*** -0.3487*** -0.3515*** -0.4318*** -0.4318*** -0.4287*** 
  (0.0841) (0.0841) (0.0833) (0.0642) (0.0620) (0.0611) 
Manual 0.1341*** 0.1338*** 0.1340*** 0.0783*** 0.0870*** 0.0837*** 
  (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0109) 
Manual*trend -0.0067*** -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0043*** -0.0047*** -0.0046*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Diesel fuel 0.1637*** 0.1658*** 0.1645*** 0.3468*** 0.3443*** 0.3444*** 
  (0.0537) (0.0524) (0.0528) (0.0695) (0.0681) (0.0671) 
Turbocharged 0.1430*** 0.1437*** 0.1434*** 0.1043*** 0.1048*** 0.1042*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0181) 
wards 0.3977*** 0.3966*** 0.3972*** 0.4070*** 0.4054*** 0.4061*** 
  (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0139) 
Log CAFE standards 0.3205*** 0.3099*** 0.3181*** 0.6239*** 0.6709*** 0.6782*** 
  (0.0353) (0.0295) (0.0322) (0.1966) (0.1923) (0.1668) 
Gas price   -0.0174     -0.0292   
    (0.0167)     (0.0161)   
Lagged gas price     -0.0068     -0.0185 
      (0.0187)     (0.0215) 
Yearly trend 0.0119*** 0.0121*** 0.0119*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 0.0066*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.8971 0.8973 0.8972 0.865 0.8656 0.8652 
Obs 21656 21656 21656 14724 14724 14724 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log MPG. All specifications use the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form of technology level and Spec IV and V include gasoline price into the regression. Spec IV 
uses the gasoline price one year ahead of model year, which is typically the year of introduction of 
the vehicles of those model years. Spec V uses gasoline price lagged for one year, which is two 
years ahead of model year. 
 
As reported in Table 3.8, gasoline prices had no significant effect on fuel-
economy related innovation. And the sign of the coefficient of gasoline price was 
negative, contrary to what one might expect. The reason that gasoline price did not affect 
innovation directly was that CAFE standards set the average fuel economy much higher 
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than the undistorted market would have achieved. That is, even when gasoline prices 
were high, CAFE standards were still high enough to be binding. As a result, gasoline 
price fluctuations were not able to influence innovation directly.   
The reason for having a negative coefficient for gasoline price lies in the way 
CAFE standards were announced. As shown in figure 3.1, CAFE standards were 
announced after the oil crisis in the 1970s. The target standards were announced years  
   
Figure 3.1. Real gas price and CAFE standards 
 
Note: Gasoline prices are normalized to 1983 dollars. The truck standard from model year 1979-
1981 is the mean of 2WD and 4WD standards. Starting from model year 1982 is the combined 
truck standard. 
 
ahead of being effective and they gradually increased in the first decade. However, 
during this period, when the standards were increasing and firms had a high rate of 
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innovation, the real gas price dropped sharply and then stayed low for decades. As a 
result, when gas prices were included in the model, it only captured this negative 
correlation between the gas price and innovation. To conclude, with CAFE standards in 
place and being sufficiently high, gasoline price shocks had little direct effect on 
innovation in the automobile industry. 
 
Future innovation prediction  
 
In this section, I simulate innovation under the new standards using the 
estimated natural innovation rate and the induced innovation in response to CAFE 
standards. CAFE standards changed to footprint-based standards starting in 2012. 
Instead of a single average fuel economy standard for cars or trucks, the footprint-based 
method set different standards for vehicles based on their size. To simplify the 
simulation, I used the average change rates of the footprint-based standards in the 
simulation.   
My calculations showed that the average fuel economy standard increased from 2011 
to 2025 in cars by 72 percent, or a log increase of 0.542. I estimated the logarithm 
innovation rate compared to 2011 as  
(8) Growtht = (T-2011) * j + ( logSt - logS2011 ) * m   
where j is the average annual growth, T is the model year, S is CAFE standards, and m 
is the technological growth response to CAFE standards. In the car sector, as reported 
in section IV, j=0.0119 and m=0.32. Using (8) above and the estimates, I calculated 
that the total technological growth from the natural growth will be 0.167 in logarithm 
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from 2011 to 2025 and the additional growth stimulated by standard increases will be 
0.190 in logarithm, as shown in Table 3.9. This means that if firms kept the weight and 
engine power of their cars at the 2011 level, they will be able to build cars with 40.5 
percent higher MPG in 2025 than in their 2011 products, or an increase of 0.340 in 
logarithm. However, the increases in CAFE standards for cars is 0.542 in logarithm, 
suggested a 0.2 gap or shortage in innovation. Therefore, to meet the new standards in 
2025, automakers will have to decrease the weight and engine power of their cars 
compared to the 2011 level to gain better fuel economy. Compared to historical data, 
cars will have to be downsized to the 1995 level to be able to comply with the 2025 
standards, assuming that firms lower weight and engine power backward of the same 
percentage they increased weight and engine power in the past.  
 
Table 3.9. Prediction of future innovations from under new CAFE standards.  
  Cars  Trucks  
 
   Percentage  logarithm  Percentage  logarithm  
Average increase in the CAFE 
standards from 2011 to 2025  
72.0%  0.542  55.6%  0.442  
Average annual innovation  1.2%  0.012  0.7%  0.007  
Innovation response rate to 
changes in CAFE standards  
0.320  0.624  
 
Induced innovation   20.9%  0.190  37.4%  0.318  
            
Total innovation from 2011 to  
2025  
40.5%  0.340  44.6%  0.369  
Deficit to meet the 2025 targets  22.5%  0.203  7.6%  0.073  
  
 
Likewise, I calculated the future innovation in the light truck sector. The total 
induced innovation will be 37.4 percent in the truck sector, or 0.318 in logarithm from 
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2011 to 2025, and the natural innovation will be 9.8 percent, or 0.093 in logarithm. 
There is only a 7.6 percent gap that would require downsizing to meet the 2025 targets. 
I estimate that firms only need to downsize their light duty trucks to the 2008 level to 
achieve that.  
 
  
Discussion  
 
In chapter two and three, I estimated the innovation in the automobile industry 
under the pressure of CAFE standards, and then I predicted changes in future vehicle 
attributes under the new aggressive standards. I found that automakers would have a 
higher innovation rate under the new standards. I also quantified the innovation 
response rates induced by the pressure from the tightened standards. In the truck sector, 
the induced innovation would be more sensitive to changes in the standards than in the 
car sector, even though the natural innovation rate is higher in the car sector. However, 
having a positive effect on innovation is not enough to conclude that the overall effect 
of the new aggressive standards would be positive. Further studies are necessary to 
investigate whether these induced innovations in fuel economy related technologies are 
at the expense of innovation in other areas, such as safety.   
My simulation of innovation under the new aggressive CAFE standards 
suggested that automakers will have to do moderate downsizing to meet the 2025 target 
in cars, and they only need minor downsizing in trucks to meet the standards. This is a 
much more optimistic prediction than previous studies have shown.   
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Finally, by modeling innovation as a function of changes in regulation 
stringency, I present a tool that can be used in predicting future innovation under new 
regulations more precisely, and which could be used to compare between different 
scenarios in regulations by taking into account the rate of changes in the stringency 
levels. This method could also be applied to other areas with similar quantifiable 
standards or regulations as in the automobile industry.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FUNDING ROAD MAINTENANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  
VMT TAX AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The fuel economy of light duty vehicles that run in the United States has improved 
considerably in the past few decades, thanks to the CAFE standards. However, the 
improvement of fuel economy, along with an observed decline in driving, has led to 
persistently decreased revenue raised from gasoline taxes and posed a significant challenge 
for financing road maintenance services. The U.S. Department of Transportation has stated 
that the Highway Trust Fund is nearing insolvency. In 2015, on their official website, their 
ticker showed that the Highway Trust Fund would drop below safe levels by December14 
as shown in figure 4.1. 
                                                     
14 Highway Trust Fund Ticker can be found at: https://www.transportation.gov/highway-trust-
fund-ticker 
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In fact, the Department of Transportation made a similar prediction in 2014 and the 
crisis was averted by a huge transfer from the general account, which means money was 
borrowed from tax revenue of other sectors that may not necessarily use the road directly. 
With the new aggressive CAFE standards, pushed by the Obama administration, and the 
improvements in technology, average fuel economy of new vehicles will increase sharply 
before 2025 and make the gasoline tax revenue shrinkage problem even worse. In extreme 
cases, such as the introduction of electric vehicles, the users are not paying any gasoline 
tax at all while using the roads. 
Figure 4.1 Highway Trust Fund Ticker 
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Although measures were taken or discussed to cover the shortage in road 
maintenance funding. While transferring from the general account was used as a temporary 
solution, it raised fairness concerns because those who rarely drive or don’t drive at all 
have to subsidize those who drives more often. Raising gasoline tax seems to be the best 
solution economically. Economists believe that a higher gasoline tax rate would not only 
help raise the tax revenue but also better internalize the externality of driving, which 
includes pollution, congestion, accident, etc. However, considering the fact the average 
fuel economy of new vehicles will be over 50 percent higher than current models in the 
next decade, to fully compensate the revenue losses from the decreases in gasoline 
consumption requires the federal and state governments to make huge increases in the tax 
rate in a relatively short period of time. Such major increases in gasoline tax are not 
politically feasible. Unlike European countries, the general public in the United States is 
strongly against any form of gasoline tax increases. In fact, most politicians consider it 
political suicide to propose major increases in gasoline taxes. Another problem with an 
increased gasoline tax is that new innovation in the automobile industry allows automakers 
to provide their consumers with hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles, which have 
extremely high MPG compared to traditional internal combustion engine vehicles. The 
drivers of these highly efficient vehicles spend much less than the average driver on 
gasoline and thus pay much less gasoline tax. As the market share of hybrid and electric 
vehicles becomes larger, increases in the gasoline tax rate will have little effect on 
collecting tax revenue from the users of these new types of vehicles.  
Therefore, to remedy this problem, introducing a VMT tax, which charges people 
based on the distance they drive instead of the gasoline they purchase, has received 
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increased attention in the policy world. One traditional mechanism to charge driving by 
distance traveled and to raise funds is collecting toll fees. However, only a relatively small 
portion of roads, mostly highways, are suitable for setting up toll stations. Collecting toll 
fees on local roads, especially areas with multiple intersections can be disturbing and could 
affect the efficiency of road usage. Another way to charge driving by distance is to install 
electronic devices such as a GPS to record traveling distance and locations of traveling. 
The government can then use the recorded travelling information to calculate fees and bill 
the drivers. Oregon is the first state in the United States that imposed a voluntary VMT tax 
program in 2014 after experiments of pilot projects using this method. A GPS tracking 
device was installed on volunteered vehicles15 and drivers were charge at a rate of 1.5 
cents16 per mile of their traveled distance in public roads17. However, such a method also 
raises privacy concerns because some people are afraid that the governments may abuse 
the recorded information considering they technically would have all the information of 
people’s travelling records, including their whereabouts at any time, whether they were 
speeding, etc.  
Despite the national discussion on the feasibility of replacing the per gallon based 
gasoline tax with a VMT tax, little research has been conducted in estimating the potential 
impact of this tax scheme at the national level. In this chapter, I explore how a nationwide 
uniform VMT tax would potentially alter households’ driving behavior and tax revenue, 
                                                     
15 Installation cost of the GPS system is approximately $250 per vehicle. 
16 Oregon state government uses 20 as the average MPG of the state vehicle fleet. Their current 
state gasoline tax is 30 cents per gallon; therefore, the VMT tax rate was set at 1.5 cents per 
mile so it is equivalent to the gasoline tax rate payed by an average driver. 
17 Oregon frames the VMT tax as a road usage fee. Therefore, the government cannot charge 
people when they are driving on private roads. This is part of the reason why a GPS recording 
system is necessary in the project. 
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especially when the overall fleet fuel economy improves rapidly. My analysis includes two 
steps. The first is to use household survey data to assess households’ sensitivity of driving 
demands to the changes in their driving costs, which is a combination of fuel costs and 
taxes. I used the 2009 NHTS to collect data on household owned vehicles and annual miles 
traveled as well as their socio-demographic information and regional characteristics. I also 
collected data on vehicle attributes including weight, class, horsepower, fuel economy 
using Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 1971-2010 and data from www.automobile-
catalog.com. I merged the two datasets and estimated how households with different types 
of vehicles would adjust their annual vehicle usage according to the changes in their driving 
costs. My results show that households with multiple vehicles are more sensitive to driving 
cost changes compared to households that only have one vehicle. The usage of SUVs and 
vans, which are more related to recreational purposes, are more sensitive to driving cost 
fluctuations than the usage of small cars, which are more related to daily commute. 
Next, I used the estimates obtained in the first step to simulate the tax revenue and 
driving behavior change under different scenarios, including changes in gasoline tax 
rates, changes in pre-tax gasoline prices, and replacing the gasoline tax with a uniform 
VMT tax. A uniform VMT tax does not discriminate vehicle type or fuel economy of 
vehicles. I solved the per mile tax rates that would generate a similar amount of tax 
revenue as a gasoline tax does (this scenario is based on the VMT tax scheme adopted in 
Oregon) in each state. My results indicate that a VMT tax would be slightly more 
regressive than the current gasoline tax. The annual tax burden in low income households 
would slightly increase and the tax burden in high income households would slightly 
decline. This type of VMT tax would increase the driving costs of high MPG vehicles 
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and decrease the driving costs of low MPG vehicles, which was criticized for creating a 
negative incentive on expending usage of efficient vehicles. However, my simulations 
also show that as because the overall fuel economy continues to increase, a VMT tax 
could provide a much more stable tax revenue without making any major adjustment in 
the tax rates. On the other hand, the current gasoline tax, would face a slide in tax 
revenue as fleet fuel economy improves. 
This research contributes to the study on VMT taxation and adds to the literature 
of the rebound effect in driving behavior. More importantly, my work aims to inform the 
ongoing policy discussion on using a VMT tax as an infrastructure funding mechanism to 
offset the losses of gasoline tax revenue, resulting from increasingly fuel-efficient 
vehicles. This issue has become particularly urgent because the current CAFE standards 
seek to rapidly improve overall fuel economy and are expected to further bolster the 
usage of fuel-efficient vehicles and erode the tax revenue collected for road maintenance. 
My work suggests that a VMT tax may serve as a promising alternative to gasoline tax 
under the current regulations and environment in the United States.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
In 2008, the federal gasoline tax was 18.4 cents per gallon and the state gasoline 
tax ranged from 7.5 cents to 37.5 cents per gallon18. Compared to the EU countries, the 
United Sstates had much lower tax rates on gasoline consumption. Parry and Small 
                                                     
18 Georgia had the lowest state gasoline tax rate and Washington had the highest tax rate. 
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(2005) estimated that the optimal gasoline tax should be set at $1.01 per gallon in the 
United States to be able to internalize all the externalities of driving, including congestion 
costs, pollution costs, and accident costs. This tax rate is over 100% higher than the 
combined federal and state gasoline taxes in most states. Policy makers in the United 
States face great pressure from the general public when any form of gasoline tax increase 
is proposed. For example, the federal gasoline tax, had been fixed at 18.4 cents since 
1997, regardless of the inflation in expenditures. Because raising gasoline taxes on a 
large scale is infeasible, people seek other methods to generate a more stable revenue for 
road maintenance costs. Therefore, taxes that are designed to charge people for their road 
usage instead of gasoline consumption became of great interest to researchers and policy 
makers. 
There are several types of road pricing that charges drivers base on the distance 
they travel or even the time window in which they travel on certain routes. One of the 
most common is highway tolls, which typically charges highway users depending on the 
length they drive between where they enter and exit the highway. In some highly 
congested areas, local governments also charge congestion fees/peak-period fees during 
peak hours as a tool to manage driving demand and gain tax revenue during the process. 
The uniform VMT tax I explore in this chapter is also a form of road pricing. However, 
unlike highway toll fees, which are only implemented on certain routes, I look into a 
more general tax that applies to all driving to replace the current gasoline tax. This 
uniform tax set a per mile based tax rate regardless of vehicle model and fuel economy of 
all light duty vehicles. 
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Dozens of pilot programs of mileage based taxation were implemented across the 
nation in the late 2000s and early 2010s when the federal government and state 
governments realized their gasoline tax revenues were at risk because of the improved 
efficiency of new vehicles, which is a direct result of more stringent CAFE standards. 
Pilot programs were run to assess the feasibility of technologies and the attitude of the 
participants. GPS systems were installed on the participating vehicles in these programs 
to record distance and jurisdiction of all vehicle use and the participants were charged 
accordingly. Studies on these pilot programs suggested that most participants had a more 
positive view of the mileage based tax after experiencing the programs. However, there 
was also a higher cost to collect tax revenue compared to the pay-at-pump gasoline tax, 
mainly because of the extra technology requirements.  
After a pilot program in 2012, Oregon passed the Senator Bill 810 in 2013 and 
established the first mileage-based revenue program for light duty vehicles in the US. 
They began a state wide voluntary VMT tax program in 201519. The tax was framed as a 
road usage fee used to repair damaged roads. A uniform tax rate was set at 1.5 cents per 
mile regardless of vehicle type and model. Drivers were only charged for their driving on 
Oregon’s public roads and the GPS systems installed recorded all the distance and routes 
they traveled. Participants of the program received monthly bills of their road use charges 
and had the state gasoline tax refunded when they purchased gasoline at pumps in 
Oregon. In this chapter, I focus on a uniform VMT tax that is very similar to what 
Oregon adopted to replace both the federal and state gasoline taxes. 
                                                     
19 The current program is called OReGO: http://www.myorego.org/. 
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To simulate driving demands and then calculate tax revenue under different taxes, 
I estimated vehicle usage changes with respect to changes in post-tax driving costs using 
household survey data. This part of the study also contributes to the literatures of the 
rebound effect, which looks into the relationship between fuel costs and driving demands. 
The estimated elasticities of driving distance with respect to fuel price range from 0.05 to 
0.87 in various studies. Greene (1992) used annual U.S. data to estimate the rebound 
effect at 0.05 to 0.15 in both the long run and short run. He also found evidence that the 
elasticities decline over time. Using the same data, Jones (1993) estimated a long run 
elasticity of 0.31 and a short run elasticity of 0.11. Schimek (1996) accounted for CAFE 
standards and also used the annual U.S. data. He estimated a long run elasticity of 0.29.  
In studies that used less aggregated data, Haughton and Sarkar (1996) obtained a 
rebound effect of 0.16 in the short run and 0.22 in the long run. West (2004) estimated a 
rebound effect of 0.87 using the 1997 Consumer Expenditure Survey data. On the other 
hand, Pickrell and Schimek (1999) studied the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation 
Survey (NPTS), which resulted in a rebound effect of 0.04 by Su (2012) obtained a short 
run elasticity of 0.03 and a long run elasticity of 0.11 using the 2009 NHTS data. Overall, 
most long run rebound effect estimates fell in the vicinity of 0.2-0.3, while short run 
effects varied among studies that used different data and methods. 
 
 
Empirical Model 
The major purpose of this study is to compare changes in tax revenue under 
different tax mechanisms and tax rates. To make such a comparison, quantitative 
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estimates of driving demand and tax revenue under different scenarios are key to the 
simulation. I modeled the annual usage or driving demand in terms of vehicle miles 
traveled in individual household vehicles as the following, 
(1)          Mij = f(GPj, Tij, Xj) 
where Mij is the annual VMT of individual vehicle i in household j, GPj is the fuel cost an 
individual household faces,  Tij is the type of individual vehicle i, and Xj is the set of 
socio-demographic and regional information of household j. The fuel cost I used here is 
the self-reported average annual post-tax fuel cost of households, in terms of dollar per 
gallon. There are two reasons I used self-reported fuel cost from the survey data. The first 
is that more detailed annual average at-pump gasoline price at the zip code level is not 
publicly available. Therefore, compared to using more aggregated gasoline price data, 
household level data can provide more region specific information. The second is that 
even for households living in the same area, fuel prices vary because of their commute 
behaviors, route preferences, and gasoline station preferences20. Therefore, the self-
reported fuel costs better reflect the self-realized, and household specific driving costs, 
which is one of the key elements that affect vehicle usage in households. This is further 
discussed in the data section. Vehicle type describes the vehicle category of individual 
vehicles. In this study, I divided all light duty vehicles into five categories: small cars, 
large cars, pickups, SUVs, and vans. At certain levels, vehicle type reflects a household’s 
the type of traveling. For example, vans and SUVs are more often used for family trips 
while small cars, which usually have relatively high MPG, are more often used for the 
                                                     
20 For example, a driver who lives and works in New York City often may choose to purchase 
gasoline from New Jersey to save costs. In such cases, using the gasoline cost reported by the 
driver might be more accurate than using the average gasoline price of his residence area. 
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daily commute. Socio-demographic information includes annual income of sampled 
households, education, race, and age group of household respondents, life cycle21 of 
households, number of workers and number of drivers in households, and respondent’s 
distance to work. Reginal information includes the population density of households’ 
residence areas, the size of metropolitan statistical area (MSA)22, whether the household 
lives is located in a rural area and whether there is rail service in the area. 
 Following an approach similar to Su (2012), I model the first empirical model as 
the following, 
(2) ln(Mij) = β ln(GPj) + Xj’ B + eij 
In this model, the dependent variable is log annual VMT. The benefit of using log 
annual VMT and log gasoline price is that the coefficient of log gasoline price can be 
directly interpreted as the elasticity of an annual VMT with respect to gasoline price. 
These estimates can be used to compare with previous studies in rebound effect as a 
check of data quality. To further explore the heterogeneity of driving demand elasticities 
among different types of vehicles, I added a set of vehicle category dummies and 
interacted them with the gasoline price and extended the empirical model as, 
(3) ln(Mij) = β ln(GPj) + GPj * Ti’B1 + Ti’B2 + Xj’B3 + eij 
T is a set of vehicle type dummies, which include large car, pickup, SUV, and van. So β 
represents the elasticity of an annual VMT of small cars with respect to gasoline price. 
                                                     
21 In NHTS data, life cycle describes the composition of a household. It reports the number of 
elders, adults and children in a household. 
22 Metropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities delineated by the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). MSA is used by Federal statistical agencies in collecting statistics. A metro 
area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population. The historical delineation of 
MSA can be found on the U.S. Census Bureau website: 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/pastmetro.html 
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The linear combination of β1 and Ti’B1 represent the elasticities of driving demand in 
other vehicle categories. 
 To better simulate and provide more straight forward estimates of driving demand 
with respect to fuel cost changes, I modeled the second empirical model as the following, 
(4) Mij = β GPj + Xj’ B + eij 
In this model, I regressed the annual VMT on gasoline price instead of using log annual 
VMT and log gasoline price. The benefit of this model is that the coefficients of gasoline 
prices provide a direct mileage estimate of driving demand in response to gasoline price 
change in dollar terms. Similarly, I also added vehicle category dummies and interacted 
them with the gasoline price to further estimate driving responses in different types of 
vehicles, 
(5) Mij = β GPj + GPj * Ti’B1 + Ti’B2 + Xj’B3 + eij 
As discussed in formula (3), β represents the response rate of small cars when facing 
changes in fuel costs and the response rates of other types of vehicles are the linear 
combination of β and Ti’B1. 
 Because this study focuses on the estimation of tax revenue collected from using 
vehicles, I only kept households that possess vehicle(s) in the data. I further divided these 
households into two different types, single vehicle households and multiple vehicle 
households. In single vehicle households, family members have fewer options when 
facing fuel cost changes compared with multiple vehicle households. Thus, I ran 
empirical models (2)-(5) separately in these two types of households to compare the 
differences in their responses.   
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Data 
 
In this paper I used the 2009 NHTS data to obtain households’ socio-demographic 
information, regional information of their residences, fuel costs households faced, as well 
as their vehicle choices and annual usages. I then used data from WAY and AC to 
ascertain more detailed information of vehicle models. 
 
2009 NHTS data 
 
The NHTS was conducted by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT) in 2001 and 2009. I focused on the 
2009 survey data to make an analysis that reflects the most recent behavior of 
households. The NHTS data include information on travel demands as well as socio-
demographic of sampled households. A random digit dialing (RDD) sampling procedure 
was used to initially select the national sample of household participants, as well as to 
conduct follow-up household and personal phone surveys for the national sample. 
Additional “add-on” surveys were conducted in certain regions by request. Although 
households were the sampling unit, many households had multiple drivers and passenger 
vehicles for which I used both individual data and household level data.   
The 2009 NHTS sample includes 25,510 households in the original national 
sample and 124,637 households in the add-on sample. Households that claimed to own 
vehicles were also asked to provide detailed information about their vehicles, their usage, 
as well as fuel prices they faced. The published data contain three separate files, 
household, individual, and vehicle files. The vehicle file records information regarding 
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vehicle type, make, model, and model year, all of which are reported using the NHTSA 
coding system. Using these model codes, I merged additional vehicle attribute 
information that were primarily collected from WAY and AC data. Despite my best 
efforts, in some cases I was unable to match some of the vehicles in the NHTS data with 
the WAY and AC data because of missing or incorrectly coded or reported vehicle make, 
model, and/or year. I succeeded in matching 91.9 percent of total passenger vehicles in 
the 2009 NHTS. 
I then made a series of cleaning steps in the merged data. I removed unmatched 
vehicles for which I did not have vehicle attribute information and thus could not be used 
in the analysis. I also dropped households that have unreliable information, such as 
reporting unreasonably high total annual vehicle usage, per driver annual miles traveled, 
or fuel prices. Detailed steps of data merging, data cleaning, and sample statistics are 
provided in the appendix. 
 
Vehicle attribute data (WAY and AC) 
I collected attribute data from WAY of all vehicles sold in the U.S. market 
between 1971 and 2011 and from AC between 1945 and 2011. The data source is the 
same as the vehicle attribute data I used in chapter one but the data I used here cover a 
longer period of time. I used both data to include as many vehicle models as possible so I 
could accurately match vehicle attributes with vehicles reported in the NHTS data. I then 
made several cleaning steps before merging the vehicle attribute data with the household 
survey data. Similar to what I did in chapter two, I constructed the fuel type of all internal 
combustion vehicles using the reported compression ratio. I assigned fuel type as 
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gasoline if the compression ratio of the engine is less than 12 and as diesel if the 
compression ratio is above 12. I also constructed transmission type for earlier years in 
WAY when several transmissions were reported for the same trim. I picked only the first 
reported transmission as the standard trim to determine whether the vehicle model used a 
manual transmission or an automatic transmission.  
In the WAY data, the MPG reported reflect the EPA adjusted MPG ratings. 
Because the EPA changed their method for estimating MPG ratings over time, only the 
combined adjusted MPG rating is reported before 1985. Beginning in 1985, adjusted 
MPGs were reported as two different variables, the city MPG and the highway MPG. The 
city MPG was calculated as 0.9 * EPA tested city MPG and highway MPG was 
calculated as 0.78 * EPA tested highway MPG.  
In 2008, the EPA adjusted their MPG rating methods again. This new method 
took more variables, such as outdoor temperature and air-conditioning, into account. This 
change resulted in a decrease in EPA adjusted MPG for most vehicles. The new formulas 
used by the EPA were: 
Adjusted city MPG =
1
0.003259 +
1.1805
Tested city MPG
, 
Adjusted highway MPG =
1
0.001376 +
1.3466
Tested highway MPG
. 
I used these formulas and the adjusted MPG to reverse compute tested MPG and 
then applied the formulas used prior to 2008 to obtain adjusted MPG numbers that are 
comparable to those for previous model years.  I applied the same method the EPA used 
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to construct combined MPG, which is the weighted harmonic mean of adjusted city MPG 
and adjusted highway MPG using a city/highway ratio of 0.55/0.45. 
The AC data do not report the EPA MPG ratings but rather provide engineering 
derived fuel economy estimates. I calculated the combined MPG using city MPG and 
highway MPG reported in the AC data using the same city/highway ratio of 0.55/0.45.  
Compared with the WAY dataset, combined MPG in the AC dataset is much lower for 
similar vehicle models of the same model year because of the difference in estimation 
methods. To address this difference, I estimated the average differences in MPG between 
the two data sets by vehicle classes. Following Knittel (2011), I controlled for vehicle 
attributes related to MPG, such as horsepower, curb weight, torque, transmission type, 
and fuel type. The precise econometric specification used is:  
(6)  lnMPGit =Tt + β1lnWit + β2lnHPit + β3lnQit + β4Mt + β5Mt * t + β6Dit  
+ β7WAYit + X’itB + ϵit, 
where MPG is the fuel economy of the vehicle, T is the model year, W is the curb weight, 
HP is the horsepower, Q is the torque, M is a dummy for manual transmission, D is a 
dummy for diesel fuel use, and WAY is a dummy for the WAY dataset that equals one if 
the observation is from the WAY dataset. X includes dummies for different 
manufactures.  
The WAY dataset does not report vehicle torque before 1997, so using 
specification one only allows vehicles after 1996 in the WAY dataset to enter the 
regression.  To include more vehicles prior to model year 1997, I also considered a 
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second specification which removed torque from formula (6) and only used horsepower 
as the measure of engine output23: 
(7)  lnMPGit = Tt + β1lnWit + β2lnHPit + β3Mt + β4Mt * t + β5Dit  
+ β6WAYit + X’itB + ϵit. 
Table 4.1 reports the regression results of both specifications in cars and table 4.2 reports 
the regression results of light duty trucks in the WAY and the AC data. The coefficients  
 Table 4.1. Estimation of MPG differences between AC and WAY data (cars). 
  Small Cars Medium Cars Large Cars 
  SP 1 SP 2 SP 1 SP 2 SP 1 SP 2 
Log horsepower -0.1490 -0.4480 -0.1310 -0.4640 0.0190 -0.4470 
  -(.0750) -(.0140) -(.0330) -(.0140) -(.0330) -(.0240) 
Log weight -0.2980 -0.5250 -0.2990 -0.5630 -0.1560 -0.4090 
  -(.0580) -(.0440) -(.0530) -(.0430) -(.0410) -(.0920) 
Log torque -0.4120  -0.4670  -0.6670  
  -(.0990)  -(.0370)  -(.0530)  
Manual transmission 0.0580 0.0590 0.0420 0.0460 0.0780 0.0880 
  -(.0060) -(.0060) -(.0110) -(.0100) -(.0060) -(.0120) 
Manual transmission*t -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 
  (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) -(.0010) 
Diesel engine 0.2740 0.2020 0.0890 0.0290 0.1650 0.1530 
  -(.0560) -(.0290) -(.0540) -(.0510) -(.0080) -(.0240) 
WAY data dummy 0.3700 0.3370 0.4230 0.3850 0.5140 0.4910 
  -(.0190) -(.0180) -(.0120) -(.0130) -(.0070) -(.0130) 
Turbo charged 0.1520 0.0900 0.1940 0.0940 0.2920 0.0170 
  -(.0220) -(.0190) -(.0170) -(.0440) -(.0170) -(.1060) 
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Manufacture fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of observation 15273 16871 15235 16372 17440 17794 
R-squared 0.9307 0.9245 0.9509 0.9448 0.9309 0.9189 
Note: The coefficient of WAY data dummy estimates the difference in MPG rating due to 
differences in estimation methods in cars after controlling for other vehicle attributes. Positive 
coefficient suggests that the MPG rating in WAY data is higher than that of AC data for similar 
models.  
                                                     
23 Horsepower and torque are highly correlated variables.  Horsepower=torque*Revolution per 
minute (RPM)/5,250. The horsepower and torque reported in the AC and the WAY data are the 
maximum horsepower and the maximum torque of the engine, which typically occur at different 
RPM levels. 
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of the “WAY data” dummy in all regressions provide the average differences of log MPG 
between the AC and WAY datasets in each vehicle class after controlling for other 
vehicle attributes. The differences between the coefficients of the “WAY data” dummy 
are small across the two specifications for each vehicle class. Considering that 
specification two covers a longer time period than the WAY dataset and thus covers more  
Table 4.2. Estimation of MPG differences between AC and WAY data (trucks). 
  Pickups SUV/CUV Vans 
  SP 1 SP 2 SP 1 SP 2 SP 1 SP 2 
Log horsepower 0.1180 -0.2280 0.0980 -0.2970 0.1590 -0.2390 
  -(.0490) -(.0140) -(.0520) -(.0310) -(.0700) -(.0640) 
Log weight -0.2510 -0.4660 -0.3460 -0.6080 -0.6480 -0.6370 
  -(.0470) -(.0230) -(.0310) -(.0380) -(.0330) -(.0680) 
Log torque -0.4270  -0.5360  -0.4230  
  -(.0590)  -(.0650)  -(.0870)  
Manual transmission 0.0410 0.0700 0.0610 0.0470 0.0880 0.0490 
  -(.0180) -(.0320) -(.0040) -(.0050) -(.0330) -(.0270) 
Manual transmission*t -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0020 
  -(.0010) -(.0020) (.0000) (.0000) -(.0010) -(.0010) 
Diesel engine 0.3000 0.1330 0.3880 0.2350    
  -(.0080) -(.0120) -(.0670) -(.0640)    
WAY data 0.4010 0.4230 0.4180 0.3990 0.3520 0.2940 
  -(.0100) -(.0030) -(.0160) -(.0160) -(.0210) -(.0240) 
Turbo charged 0.0420 -0.0230 0.1600 0.0650    
  -(.0130) -(.0070) -(.0170) -(.0140)     
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Manufacture fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of observation 4296 5413 9358 9958 1772 2523 
R-squared 0.8201 0.7711 0.9122 0.8882 0.9173 0.8309 
Note: The coefficient of WAY data dummy estimates the difference in MPG rating due to 
differences in estimation methods in cars after controlling for other vehicle attributes. Positive 
coefficient suggests that the MPG rating in WAY data is higher than that of AC data for similar 
models. 
 
vehicle models recorded in the NHTS data, I used the estimated coefficients of “WAY 
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data” dummy in specification two to adjust the reported MPG in the AC data. This 
resulted in MPG increases of 40 percent in small cars, 47 percent in medium cars24, 63 
percent in large cars, 53 percent in pickups, 49 percent in SUV/CUV25, and 34 perent in 
vans of the AC data. I made these adjustments to remove the differences in MPG rating 
that were caused by different calculation methods so the vehicle fuel economy 
information in the AC data are comparable to that of the WAY data.  
 
Vehicle distribution in households 
 
After removing all households that do not own vehicles and those with missing or 
questionable information in key household socio-demographic and/or regional 
information, there were a total of 94,645 households and 207,382 vehicles left in my final 
sample of analysis among 48 states26. As shown in table 4.3, in households with multiple 
vehicles, the fleet consisted of a relatively high percentage of light duty trucks, including 
pickups, SUVs and vans. On the other hand, over 54% of the vehicles in single vehicle 
households are from the small cars category. In all households, small cars have a mean 
MPG of over 27, while other types of vehicles only have a mean MPG in the vicinity of 
20. Also, average fuel economy is slightly higher in single vehicle households in all 
vehicle categories. 
 
                                                     
24 In this study, I combined the small cars and the medium cars into the small cars category. 
This is because their roles in households are similar. 
25 In this study, I combined SUV and CUV in the same category as they serve similar travelling 
purposes in households. 
26 Hawaii and Iowa are not included in this study because of the incomplete regional and tax 
rate information in the NHTS data. 
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Table 4.3. Vehicle composition in single vehicle and multiple vehicle households. 
 Single vehicle households Multiple vehicle households 
Vehicle 
type Count Percentage Mean MPG Count Percentage Mean MPG 
Small cars 17,105 54.9% 27.4 69,005 39.2% 27.1 
Large cars 4,273 13.7% 21.9 14,802 8.4% 21.8 
Pickups 2,285 7.3% 20.0 38,294 21.7% 19.5 
SUVs 5,217 16.7% 20.9 39,381 22.3% 19.8 
Vans 2,294 7.4% 20.5 14,726 8.4% 20.3 
Total 31,174   24.5 176,208   22.8 
 
 
 Table 4.4. Vehicle distribution across income groups. 
   Percentage of vehicle type 
Household 
annual 
income 
Number of 
households 
Percentage of 
single vehicle 
households 
Small 
cars 
Large 
cars Pickups SUVs Vans 
< 5000 1025 70.2% 47.9% 12.5% 17.6% 14.0% 8.1% 
5000-9999 2437 72.0% 49.8% 12.4% 18.3% 11.5% 8.0% 
10000-14999 4158 69.4% 47.9% 12.5% 18.8% 13.3% 7.5% 
15000-19999 4826 61.5% 45.0% 13.2% 19.7% 13.8% 8.4% 
20000-24999 4349 56.9% 45.0% 12.7% 19.5% 14.6% 8.2% 
25000-29999 6385 46.8% 41.3% 12.9% 21.6% 15.6% 8.6% 
30000-34999 3774 42.7% 41.0% 11.7% 21.8% 16.6% 8.9% 
35000-39999 6216 36.1% 39.9% 11.5% 22.4% 17.6% 8.6% 
40000-44999 3242 33.0% 39.8% 10.0% 22.3% 19.0% 8.9% 
45000-49999 6222 28.6% 39.0% 10.9% 23.1% 18.8% 8.2% 
50000-54999 2924 26.5% 40.0% 9.2% 22.6% 20.0% 8.2% 
55000-59999 5623 21.5% 39.6% 9.3% 22.3% 20.7% 8.2% 
60000-64999 2198 19.2% 40.0% 8.0% 22.3% 21.3% 8.4% 
65000-69999 4843 16.9% 39.2% 9.1% 21.0% 22.3% 8.4% 
70000-74999 2250 14.7% 39.5% 7.7% 21.7% 23.0% 8.2% 
75000-79999 4592 13.2% 40.1% 8.0% 20.7% 23.2% 8.0% 
80000-99999 9231 9.2% 39.8% 6.7% 19.9% 24.5% 9.1% 
≥ 100000 20350 5.9% 42.9% 6.6% 14.9% 28.1% 7.5% 
 
Vehicle choices in households are also highly related to household income. As 
reported in table 4.4, over 70 percent of households that have an annual income below  
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$10,000 and own a vehicle have only one vehicle. Meanwhile, over 94 percent of 
households that have an annual income above $100,000 own multiple vehicles. Low 
income households are also more likely to choose cars compared to high income 
households, over 60 percent vehicles in households with an annual income below 
$15,000 are small cars or large cars while less than 50 percent of vehicles in high income 
households are cars. High income households are not only more likely to own multiple 
vehicles but they are also more likely to own SUVs, which are often used for family trips. 
In households with an annual income above $100,000, 28 percent of their vehicles are 
SUVs, two times the rate in low income households. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
VMT TAX SCENARIOS SIMULATION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present and discuss the regression results of the empirical models 
discussed in chapter four. The results of these regressions indicate how household vehicle 
usage responded to the variations in fuel costs. Next, I use the estimates obtained from 
these estimates to solve for VMT tax rates in each state that would generate the same tax 
revenue as the current gasoline tax. Finally, I predict changes in driving under different 
tax and fuel economy scenarios, and thus estimate tax revenues under various settings.  
 
Regression results 
 Table 5.1 shows the regression results of model (2) and (3), of which the 
dependent variable is log annual VMT. Model (3) also includes interaction terms of fuel 
costs and vehicle type dummies. I also compared the different responses in single vehicle 
households versus responses in households with multiple vehicles.  
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In the results of model specification (2), the coefficients of log gasoline price 
represent the elasticity of driving demand with respect to change in fuel cost, or the 
rebound effect. My estimation of the whole fleet is -0.476. In households with multiple 
vehicles, the demand is more elastic with an elasticity of -0.577. However, in single 
vehicle households, the demand is very inelastic. The elasticity of driving demand is only 
-0.162 and not significantly different from zero. 
In model specification (3), the coefficients of log gasoline price show the baseline 
elasticity of small cars in households and the interaction term of other vehicle type 
dummies and gas price show the difference between the elasticities of other vehicles and 
small cars. The actual elasticity of vehicles other than small cars should be the linear 
combination of the baseline elasticity and the corresponding interaction terms. I tested the 
linear combination of these interaction terms and the baseline and table 5.2 indicate the 
elasticities of all types of vehicles.  
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Table 5.1. Household vehicle usage (Annual VMT) response to fuel cost change (log). 
 Single vehicle Multiple vehicle All 
  (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) 
Log Gas Price -0.186 -0.162 -0.298 -0.557 -0.243 -0.476 
 (.167) (.127) (.089) (.062) (.079) (.057) 
Large car -0.492   0.684   0.374   
 (.417)   (.255)   (.220)   
Pickup 0.094   -0.022   -0.008   
 (.471)   (.153)   (.144)   
SUV 0.616   0.285   0.343   
 (.343)   (.147)   (.135)   
Van -0.544   1.155   0.970   
 (.534)   (.225)   (.209)   
Log GP*Large car 0.414   -0.598   -0.331   
 (.373)   (.229)   (.198)   
Log GP*Pickup 0.018   -0.123   -0.140   
 (.420)   (.136)   (.129)   
Log GP*SUV -0.440   -0.134   -0.188   
 (.305)   (.131)   (.121)   
Log GP*Van 0.576   -0.902   -0.744   
 (.476)   (.202)   (.187)   
Log population density -0.063 -0.066 -0.035 -0.032 -0.035 -0.031 
 (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Number of worker 0.075 0.077 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (.015) (.015) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Household size 0.024 0.032 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.017 
 (.016) (.015) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Number of driver 0.145 0.146 0.036 0.026 0.016 0.005 
 (.017) (.017) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.006) 
Log distance to work 0.141 0.140 0.128 0.124 0.129 0.125 
 (.006) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Rail in area -0.053 -0.064 -0.059 -0.046 -0.062 -0.050 
 (.020) (.020) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
Rural 0.071 0.079 0.033 0.027 0.033 0.027 
 (.017) (.017) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) 
Male household respondent 0.213 0.224 0.043 0.041 0.053 0.047 
  (.011) (.011) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Income fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Age fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Education fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Race fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Life cycle fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
MSA size fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs 31174 31174 176208 176208 207382 207382 
R squared 0.2061 0.2029 0.1106 0.1005 0.1162 0.1068 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual VMT. 
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Table 5.2. Annual VMT elasticity (with respect to gasoline price) change. 
  Single vehicle Muti-vehicle All 
Small car -0.186 -0.298 -0.243 
 (.167) (.089) (.079) 
Large car 0.228 -0.896 -0.575 
 (.341) (.218) (.187) 
Pickup -0.168 -0.422 -0.384 
 (.390) (.111) (.108) 
SUV -0.626 -0.433 -0.431 
 (.267) (.110) (.103) 
Van 0.390 -1.200 -0.988 
  (.453) (.190) (.615) 
 
Note: The elasticities of small cars are the coefficients of log gasoline price in table 5.1. The 
elasticities of other vehicles are the linear combinations of log gasoline price and the interaction 
terms of gasoline price and corresponding vehicle category dummies in table 5.1. 
 
The results suggest in single vehicle households, vehicle usage is overall less 
elastic than that of multiple vehicle households. In fact, in single vehicle households, only 
the elasticity of the SUV is significant, which is estimated to be -0.626. In multiple 
vehicle households, vehicle usage responses are all significant in all vehicle categories, 
with the driving demand of small cars being the least elastic and demand of vans being 
the most elastic. Multiple vehicle households normally have more options than single 
vehicle households in traveling options when facing fuel cost changes, such as within 
household carpooling or adjusting vehicle choices. For example, couples may drive only 
one car to go to work instead of driving separate vehicles when fuel cost increases. Also, 
multiple vehicle households may choose to use the vehicle that is relatively more 
efficient in the household when driving becomes more expensive. 
The results also suggest that households’ responses to gasoline costs vary among 
different vehicle types. Choices of vehicle type are related to its function in households, 
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especially in multiple vehicle households. Small cars, which usually have high MPG, are 
used more often for daily commute, which has very inelastic driving demand, while 
SUVs and vans are used more for recreational purposes, such as family trips, which are 
more elastic in traveling demand. Such differences are important when exploring the 
effect of replacing gasoline tax with a uniform VMT tax, which would have different 
impact on driving costs in different types of vehicles. 
Table 5.3 reports the regression results using model specification (4) and (5), 
which use annual VMT and fuel cost instead of their log forms. In model specification 
(4), the coefficients of gasoline price can be interpreted as the average change in annual 
mileage driven of an individual vehicle when facing $1 increase in per gallon gasoline 
cost. Similar to the results from using model specification (2) and (3), households with 
multiple vehicles responded much stronger to gasoline cost changes than single vehicle 
households. In specification (5), the coefficients of gasoline price are the baseline 
response rate of small cars and the response rate of other types of vehicles are the linear 
combination of the coefficients of gasoline price and the coefficients of the corresponding 
interaction terms of gasoline price and vehicle type dummies. I report the response rates 
of all vehicle types in table 5.4. 
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Table 5.3. Household vehicle usage (Annual VMT) response to fuel cost change. 
  Single vehicle Multiple vehicle All 
  (5) (4) (5) (4) (5) (4) 
Gas Price -666.0 -945.0 -636.4 -1378.0 -581.7 -1270.5 
 (375.3) (304.7) (227.9) (158.1) (198.6) (143.1) 
Large car -1637.6   3357.8   2101.4   
 (2627.5)   (1702.9)   (1452.7)   
Pickup 1552.4   757.9   726.8   
 (3409.8)   (1077.8)   (1009.2)   
SUV 7021.1   3262.6   3724.9   
 (2465.1)   (1081.9)   (989.1)   
Van 461.4   9353.4   8343.9   
 (3598.6)   (1595.6)   (1463.4)   
GP*Large car 515.1   -1024.0   -637.5   
 (858.2)   (557.9)   (475.6)   
GP*Pickup -174.1   -478.1   -470.6   
 (1108.4)   (350.6)   (328.2)   
GP*SUV -2049.3   -806.4   -959.2   
 (797.4)   (351.7)   (321.3)   
GP*Van 40.2   -2754.2   -2440.6   
 (1169.0)   (518.5)   (475.5)   
Log population density -497.6 -515.4 -388.2 -372.3 -376.4 -361.1 
 (35.3) (35.4) (19.6) (19.5) (17.5) (17.4) 
Number of worker 186.7 197.4 -107.8 -107.7 -121.0 -122.6 
 (128.4) (128.4) (36.2) (36.2) (34.7) (34.7) 
Household size 486.4 526.9 176.5 229.2 221.1 275.2 
 (149.3) (148.2) (43.1) (42.8) (40.7) (40.5) 
Number of driver 1078.0 1081.3 176.0 115.5 62.6 -2.5 
 (138.9) (139.1) (58.5) (58.3) (52.3) (52.2) 
Distance to work 108.0 108.1 69.5 68.1 1172.8 71.2 
 (34.2) (34.0) (6.4) (6.3) (19.2) (6.3) 
Rail in area -571.3 -651.9 -512.7 -446.4 -535.3 -481.3 
 (154.4) (154.3) (87.5) (86.7) (77.9) (77.3) 
Rural 571.7 619.9 408.9 382.9 409.7 384.7 
 (128.0) (128.0) (62.8) (62.8) (57.3) (57.2) 
Male household respondent 1266.7 1368.4 202.7 192.4 286.9 260.4 
  (90.3) (88.7) (41.5) (41.5) (37.6) (37.6) 
Income fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Age fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Education fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Race fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Life cycle fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
MSA size fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs 31174 31174 176208 176208 207382 207382 
R squared 0.1867 0.1843 0.1037 0.0993 0.1123 0.1082 
Notes: The dependent variable is annual VMT. 
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Table 5.4. Annual VMT response rate with respect to gasoline cost change. 
  Single vehicle Multiple vehicle All 
Small/Medium car -665.9784 -636.4166 -581.6978 
 (375) (228) (199) 
Large car -150.9252 -1660.394 -1219.179 
 (791) (523) (444) 
Pickup -840.0548 -1114.471 -1052.256 
 (1053) (283) (275) 
SUV -2715.309 -1442.824 -1540.883 
 (726) (302) (281) 
Van -625.803 -3390.664 -3022.249 
  (1124) (489) (451) 
 
Note: The response rates of small cars are the coefficients of gasoline price in table 5.3. The 
response rates of other vehicles are the linear combinations of gasoline price and the interaction 
terms of gasoline price and corresponding vehicle category dummies in table 5.3. 
 
The results are also similar to that of the log form regressions. Multiple vehicle 
households responded to gasoline cost changes significantly in all vehicle categories and 
responded stronger in large cars, and vans than single vehicle households. Single vehicle 
households only responded strongly in SUV usage. The response rates in small cars are 
very similar in both types of households (-666 in single vehicle households versus -636 in 
multiple vehicle households). Because gas taxes were set at cents per gallon and the 
uniform VMT tax is also in the form of cents per mile, I use the regression results of 
model specification (4) and (5) to perform the following simulations under various 
situations. 
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Tax revenue simulation results 
 
 In this section, I simulated the gasoline consumption, vehicle usage, and tax 
revenue using the estimates obtained from the regression results from the previous 
section. I explored several scenarios in my simulation. The first was replacing the current 
federal and state gasoline taxes with a VMT tax that would generate the same tax revenue 
in each state. I then explored how tax revenue would change under the current gasoline 
tax and the VMT tax because fleet fuel economy in the United Sstates continues to 
increase. I also compared how tax revenue would be affected when facing pre-tax 
gasoline price fluctuations. Finally, I simulated raising the current gasoline tax to the 
optimal gasoline tax rate suggested by Parry and Small (2005). 
 
Replacing gasoline tax with a uniform VMT tax 
 
The major purpose of replacing gasoline tax with a VMT tax is to provide a more 
stable tax structure. In this part of my analysis, I first solved for a set of VMT tax rates 
for each state so they would generate the same amount of tax revenue as the gasoline tax 
revenue in each state. Within each state, I first calculated the total gasoline consumption 
in each state using the reported annual usage of each vehicle and its fuel economy. I then 
calculated the combined federal and state gasoline tax revenue collected in each state 
using the corresponding per gallon gasoline tax rates and the computed gasoline 
consumption.  
A uniform VMT tax would have different effect on fuel costs for different 
vehicles. For example, a household has two vehicles, a car and a SUV. Suppose the car 
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has a MPG of 30 and the SUV has a MPG of 15 and the gasoline price is $3.00 per 
gallon, which includes 30 cents of gasoline tax. Now the government decides that instead 
of charging the per gallon gasoline tax, the household needs to pay a VMT tax that 
depends on the miles driven of each vehicle and the rate is set at 1.5 cents per mile. 
Under this new tax mechanism, to drive 30 miles using the small car, the household will 
pay 3-0.3+0.015*30 = $3.15, compared to $3.00 under the gasoline tax. And to drive 15 
miles using the SUV, the household will pay 3-0.3+0.015*15 = $2.925, while the cost 
would also be $3.00 under the gasoline tax. Therefore, now the equivalent per gallon 
gasoline cost increases for using the car and decreases for using the SUV and such 
changes in driving costs would change their vehicle usages of each vehicle. The new 
annual VMT times the VMT tax rate is the VMT tax revenue. Using the estimates I 
obtained from model specification (5), I solved for a VMT tax rate in each state so, the 
total VMT tax revenue would be the same as the current gasoline tax revenue. 
Table 5.5 lists the VMT tax rates determined for each state replacing the federal 
and state gasoline taxes. The highest VMT tax is 2.344 cents per mile in West Virginia 
and the lowest is 1.221 cents per mile in Georgia.  
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Table 5.5. VMT tax rates that replacing the 2009 gas tax in each state. 
State 
2009 State gas tax 
(cent per gallon) 
2009 State & Federal gas tax 
(cent per gallon) VMT tax (cent per mile) 
AL 18 36.4 1.617 
AR 18 36.4 1.982 
AZ 21.5 39.9 1.600 
CA 18 36.4 1.609 
CO 22 40.4 1.680 
CT 25 43.4 1.757 
DE 23 41.4 1.848 
FL 15.6 34 1.599 
GA 7.5 25.9 1.221 
IA 25 43.4 1.654 
ID 19 37.4 1.780 
IL 18 36.4 1.653 
IN 21 39.4 1.592 
KS 24 42.4 1.870 
KY 22.5 40.9 1.985 
LA 20 38.4 2.003 
MA 28.4 46.8 1.737 
MD 23.5 41.9 1.779 
ME 21 39.4 2.118 
MI 19 37.4 1.783 
MN 22.5 40.9 1.941 
MO 18.4 36.8 1.501 
MS 17 35.4 2.200 
MT 27.75 46.15 1.968 
NC 26 44.4 2.202 
ND 24 42.4 1.842 
NE 19.6 38 1.861 
NH 10.5 28.9 1.727 
NJ 18.875 37.275 1.262 
NM 24.45 42.85 1.554 
NV 30.15 48.55 1.779 
NY 23 41.4 1.886 
OH 28 46.4 2.118 
OK 17 35.4 1.633 
OR 24 42.4 1.566 
PA 30 48.4 1.877 
RI 30 48.4 2.207 
SC 16 34.4 1.628 
SD 22 40.4 1.767 
TN 20 38.4 1.787 
TX 20 38.4 1.898 
UT 24.5 42.9 1.772 
VA 21 39.4 1.543 
VT 17.5 35.9 1.731 
WA 37.5 55.9 2.077 
WI 32.2 50.6 2.208 
WV 30.9 49.3 2.344 
WY 14 32.4 1.474 
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Compared to the current gasoline tax rate, the overall miles traveled would 
slightly decrease and total gasoline consumption would slightly increase. The mean 
annual VMT per vehicle is 10,028 miles in my final sample and the mean gasoline 
consumption is 454.73 gallons per year. Under the new VMT tax, the mean annual VMT 
per vehicle would drop 0.11 percent to 10,016 miles and the mean gasoline consumption 
would increase by 0.71 percent to 457.95 gallons. Such changes happen because efficient 
vehicles would face an increased fuel cost under a VMT tax while low MPG vehicles 
would face a decreased fuel cost. This change would also affect households differently 
given their vehicle choices. High income households normally own more than one 
vehicle 
 Table 5.6. Tax burden changes in various income groups under VMT tax. 
Household 
income 
Mean annual 
gasoline tax burden 
Mean annual 
VMT tax burden 
Mean change 
in tax burden 
Percentage 
change 
under 5000 154.02 158.05 4.02 2.61% 
5000-9999 135.31 140.86 5.55 4.10% 
10000-14999 143.93 150.83 6.90 4.79% 
15000-19999 167.15 174.76 7.61 4.55% 
20000-24999 194.01 199.48 5.47 2.82% 
25000-29999 221.70 225.96 4.26 1.92% 
30000-34999 251.14 254.80 3.66 1.46% 
35000-39999 273.11 275.26 2.15 0.79% 
40000-44999 296.70 296.27 -0.43 -0.15% 
45000-49999 310.95 313.00 2.05 0.66% 
50000-54999 340.11 343.53 3.42 1.01% 
55000-59999 355.65 356.65 1.00 0.28% 
60000-64999 379.89 381.37 1.48 0.39% 
65000-69999 385.13 384.94 -0.19 -0.05% 
70000-74999 408.94 405.79 -3.15 -0.77% 
75000-79999 417.01 415.18 -1.84 -0.44% 
80000-99999 451.42 449.92 -1.50 -0.33% 
above 100000 491.37 484.91 -6.45 -1.31% 
 
 Note: Tax burdens are all in 2009 dollars. 
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while low income households are more likely to be single vehicle households and own 
cars with high MPG. As discussed in earlier sections, single vehicle households have a 
relatively inelastic driving demand when facing driving cost changes. In table 5.6 above, 
I compared the changes of the average tax burden across various income groups under a 
VMT tax. My simulation suggested that low income households would bear a heavier tax 
burden and high income households would pay slightly less tax. Thus, the uniform VMT 
tax is more regressive than the gasoline tax. However, the magnitude of the average 
changes are small both in absolute value and percentages. Overall, changing the gasoline 
tax into a VMT tax would not change people’s behavior dramatically in the short run. 
 
VMT tax versus gasoline tax under fleet fuel economy increases 
 
One of the major concern of the current gasoline tax is that the United States is 
pushing for much more stringent CAFE standards, which aim to almost double the MPG 
rating of new vehicle models by 2025. Such a huge improvement in fuel efficiency would 
further decrease the gasoline consumption in households and thus decrease the tax 
revenue collected under a per gallon based gasoline tax. Under both the VMT tax and the 
gasoline tax, increases in the overall fuel economy would decrease per mile driving cost 
and trigger the rebound effect, thus increase vehicle usage. For example, a small car has a 
fuel economy of 30 and the gasoline price the household face is $3.00 per gallon 
including 30 cents of gasoline tax. Driving 30 miles would cost the household $3 in fuel. 
If the fuel economy of the car increased by 25 percent to 37.5, then driving 30 miles 
would only cost $2.4. Therefore, in the long run, the increase in fuel economy is 
equivalent to a decrease in fuel cost for the households. However, under the VMT tax, 
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only the pre-tax fuel cost is affected when fuel economy increases. In fact, if household 
drives more as fuel economy improves, they would pay even more in VMT tax. But 
households would pay less gasoline tax because of the drop in gasoline consumption. 
 
Figure 5.1. Percentage changes of VMT and tax revenue under fleet MPG changes 
 
Note: The baseline is the gasoline tax revenue and total vehicle usage in the 2009 NHTS data 
sample. All percentage changes reflect changes in comparison to the 2009 baseline. 
 
In figure 5.1, I show the changes in tax revenue when the overall fleet fuel 
economy increases. I simulated five scenarios when the overall fleet fuel economy in the 
United States increased by 10 percent to 50 percent. In each scenario, I simulated the 
current gasoline tax mechanism and the uniform VMT tax mechanism using the VMT tax 
rates identified in the previous section. I assumed the pre-tax gasoline price would remain 
stable and households would be fully aware of the changes in their actual driving costs 
under both taxes. My simulations show the driving demand would increase as the 
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efficiency of all vehicles improve. The annual usage of vehicles would increase by 6.5 
percent if the overall fuel economy increased by 50 percent under the current gasoline 
tax. Meanwhile, the gasoline consumption and tax revenue would drop by 28.4 percent. 
Such a huge amount of tax revenue loss would make it difficult for the government to 
keep up the maintenance of the public road system. The federal and state governments 
would have to make major increases in gasoline tax rates to be able to maintain the tax 
revenue and the U.S. public would not like that. To maintain a stable tax revenue, the 
government would have to raise the gasoline tax by at least 30 percent as fleet fuel 
economy improved by 50 percent. Such major increases would face huge resistance and 
could have big impacts in other areas, such as commodity prices.  
On the other hand, if a VMT tax was implemented, when fuel economy increased 
by 50 percent, as intended by the CAFE standards, the usage of vehicles would also 
increase by 4.4 percent and the tax revenue would increase in par with the change in 
driving. The tax revenue could reflect the changes in road usage without having to make 
major adjustment in tax rates as fleet fuel economy improves. This is the biggest 
advantage of the VMT tax over the current gasoline tax.  
 
 
Stability under pre-tax gasoline price fluctuations 
 
Next I tested whether a VMT tax would respond differently to pre-tax gasoline 
price fluctuation and thus face unexpected problems when the global oil price fluctuates 
for various reasons. I simulated the different scenarios of pre-tax gasoline price changes 
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from -50 percent to +100 percent and compared the vehicle usages and tax revenue 
collected under the gasoline tax and the VMT tax. 
 
Table 5.7. Tax revenue under pre-tax gasoline price fluctuation. 
Pre-tax gas price change   
Gas 
Tax 
VMT 
Tax Percentage change 
  Mean Annual VMT 10028 10016 -0.11% 
0% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 454.73 457.95 0.71% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 173.46 173.46 0.00% 
  Mean Annual VMT 10372 10361 -0.11% 
-20% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 473.56 473.60 0.01% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 180.80 179.39 -0.78% 
  Mean Annual VMT 10888 10877 -0.10% 
-50% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 497.04 497.08 0.01% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 189.73 188.29 -0.76% 
  Mean Annual VMT 9684 9672 -0.12% 
+20% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 442.26 442.30 0.01% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 168.89 167.54 -0.80% 
  Mean Annual VMT 9167 9156 -0.12% 
+50% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 418.78 418.82 0.01% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 159.96 158.64 -0.83% 
  Mean Annual VMT 8307 8296 -0.14% 
+100% Mean gas consumption per vehicle 379.65 379.69 0.01% 
  Mean tax burden per vehicle 145.08 143.82 -0.87% 
 
Note: VMT are all in miles per year. Gasoline consumptions are all in gallons. Tax burdens are all 
in 2009 dollars.  
 
Table 5.7 reports the simulation results and compares the average annual vehicle 
usage, gasoline consumption and average tax payment per vehicle under various changes 
in pre-tax gasoline prices. Under all circumstances, gasoline price fluctuation does not 
impose obvious difference between the two types of taxes. The VMT tax revenue would 
be slightly less than the gasoline tax revenue when the pre-tax gasoline price fluctuates 
but the differences would be less than 1% in all tested cases. 
 85 
Optimal gasoline tax 
 
Previous simulations showed that a VMT tax is capable of providing a more 
reliable tax revenue flow as vehicles efficiency continues to increase. As explained in the 
literature review section, gasoline tax rates in the United States are much lower than the 
optimal gasoline tax rate that can properly integrate all externalities of driving, including 
pollutions, accidents, and congestions. Therefore, in this section, I explored how driving 
and the tax revenue would be affected under the optimal gasoline tax, which was 
calculated as $1.01 per gallon by Parry and Small (2005). I replaced all federal and state 
tax with the 1.01 per gallon optimal gasoline tax in all states and then simulated the tax 
burden of this tax. Table 5.8 reports the simulation result at the national level. Total 
annual vehicle usage would decrease by 4 percent and gasoline consumption would 
decrease by 3.3 percent. However, the tax burden on households would increase by over 
150 percent.  
 
 Table 5.8. Overall change under optimal gasoline tax. 
  Gas Tax Optimal Gas Tax Percentage change 
Mean Annual VMT 10028 9625 -4.015% 
Mean gas consumption per vehicle 454.73 439.58 -3.332% 
Mean tax burden per vehicle 173.46 443.98 155.946% 
 
Note: VMT are all in miles per year. Gasoline consumptions are all in gallons. Tax burdens are all 
in 2009 dollars.  
 
Table 5.9 shows the simulation results broken down in different income groups. 
All income groups would be affected severely should the optimal gasoline tax be 
implemented. Even the low income households would have to pay hundreds extra tax 
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money every year. Although the increase in tax expenditure is quite uniform in 
percentage among households with different levels of income, living standards of low 
income households would be affected more because the extra burden takes a larger part in 
their income. 
 
Table 5.9. Tax burden change in various income groups under optimal gas tax. 
  
Mean annual household 
gas tax burden 
Mean annual household 
optimal tax burden Mean change 
Percentage 
change 
under 5000 154.02 391.51 237.48 154% 
5000-9999 135.31 341.76 206.45 153% 
10000-14999 143.93 367.10 223.16 155% 
15000-19999 167.15 428.52 261.37 156% 
20000-24999 194.01 491.96 297.95 154% 
25000-29999 221.70 563.96 342.26 154% 
30000-34999 251.14 645.58 394.44 157% 
35000-39999 273.11 695.60 422.49 155% 
40000-44999 296.70 749.14 452.44 152% 
45000-49999 310.95 796.83 485.88 156% 
50000-54999 340.11 871.58 531.47 156% 
55000-59999 355.65 907.84 552.19 155% 
60000-64999 379.89 978.45 598.56 158% 
65000-69999 385.13 988.31 603.18 157% 
70000-74999 408.94 1042.57 633.63 155% 
75000-79999 417.01 1069.14 652.12 156% 
80000-99999 451.42 1163.26 711.84 158% 
above 100000 491.37 1260.73 769.36 157% 
 
Note: Tax burdens are all in 2009 dollars.  
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Discussion 
 
Households choose different types of vehicles based on various things and one of 
the key factors is their purpose for driving. They respond to driving cost changes 
differently based on their traveling purposes and the alternatives they have. Using the 
2009 NHTS data, I found that driving demands in single vehicle households are relatively 
more inelastic than that of multiple vehicle households. Also, vehicle usage is more 
elastic for those used more often for recreational or leisure purposes, such as vans and 
SUVs. Driving demands of vehicles more often used for daily commute, such as small 
cars, are relatively more inelastic. Also, in households with multiple vehicles, vehicle 
usages are more elastic than single vehicle households.  
Compared to the current gasoline tax, my simulations showed that a VMT tax 
would be more regressive than the current gasoline tax. However, the magnitude of the 
extra tax burden placed on low income households is small (in the vicinity of $5-$6 
annually). The benefit of adopting a VMT tax is that it would provide a much more stable 
tax revenue without having to make major adjustments in tax rates when fleet fuel 
economy continually increases sharply in response to the stringent CAFE standards. 
Although a major increase in gasoline tax is politically infeasible in the US, the VMT tax 
appears to be a better tool not only to stabilize the funding of road maintenance but it also 
better reflects the true cost of driving as fleet fuel economy increases. The per gallon 
based gasoline tax could be a good tool in pricing the pollution externality. However, as 
shown in the simulations, when fuel economy increases, it fails to keep internalizing 
other externalities of driving that are based on road usage instead of gasoline 
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consumptions. On the other hand, The VMT tax can solve the highway fund shortage in 
the long run and can better internalize the true driving cost in the US.  
The implementation of a VMT tax, especially the transition costs and other 
concerns, such as privacy, is still in debate. Also, the transition would involve a large 
initial expenditure in equipment installation cost, which is a big concern. In addition, 
during the transition period, with both the VMT tax and the gasoline tax in place, the cost 
of tax collection would be much higher. Furthermore, people’s short run responses to the 
new tax could be surprising. For example, in Oregon’s pilot program, average vehicle 
usage actually went up although participants were spending more on driving costs. 
Officials concluded this was because participants were paying less at the pump because 
they were no longer paying gasoline tax and the monthly VMT tax bills were somewhat 
less connected to their driving behavior compared to the traditional pay at the pump 
gasoline tax. Therefore, there is still a lot to learn to accurately calculate the transition 
costs. Regardless of these concerns about execution in the short run, VMT tax appears to 
be a viable alternative for gasoline tax should we want to further improve the overall fuel 
economy.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The CAFE standard is a symbolic performance based regulation. It sets standards 
on a particular attribute of a publicly sold product and leaves enough flexibility for 
producers to comply with the regulation in various ways. Four decades have passed since 
CAFE standards were first enacted. Consumers, automakers, and governments at various 
levels are now facing impacts that might not have been foreseeable when the CAFE 
standards were introduced. In this thesis, I looked into the impacts of this important 
regulation from different angles and made an attempt to predict its future impact as well 
as possible actions the government could take to mitigate some of the foreseeable 
negative impacts. 
 In chapters two and three, I studied the historical data of the attributes of vehicle 
models sold and thus regulated by CAFE standards in the U.S. market. The regulated 
industry appeared to have been resourceful in complying but CAFE standards did 
succeed in forcing firms to shift their priorities in the direction that the government 
intended for. Proven to be effective tools, CAFE standards were further tightened by the 
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U.S. government in the upcoming decade to reduce greenhouse gas emission. 
Admittedly, firms were clearly facing pressure to find a balance between complying with 
the standards and providing the larger and more powerful vehicles that consumers 
preferred. World famous firms, including Volkswagen and Mitsubishi, had been caught 
cheating in emission tests or fuel economy tests. These events, however, should not be 
seen as signs that firms have already reached their limits in innovation. Vehicle models 
that have new technology installed still keep showing up on the market every year. If 
firms behave in a manner similar to what they have in the past when CAFE standards 
were tightened sharply, my predictions suggest that we would only see a small or 
moderate decrease in the weight and engine power of upcoming new vehicle models on 
the market. Also, as the market share of vehicles using new technologies, such as the 
hybrid vehicles and the electric vehicles, increases, the pressure to downsize vehicles will 
likely be less severe than it first seemed. Therefore, we do not need to be too concerned 
that the new aggressive CAFE standards will make the new cars less safe on the road. In 
fact, I modeled the technological innovation in the automobile industry and showed that 
the tightening of the stringency of CAFE standards had pushed up the innovation rate in 
fuel economy related technologies. CAFE standards do not just help in emission control 
but have also served as an innovation driver. Firms made more improvements in fuel 
economy related innovation when CAFE standards were increasing sharply compared to 
when CAFE standards remained stable. If we believe that fuel efficiency is important for 
our future, then more stringent performance standards, such as CAFE standards could 
definitely accelerate the innovation in the desired direction. 
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 Though the CAFE standard only regulates automakers, it has also had profound 
influences outside the industry. The fuel economy of vehicles has greatly improved in the 
past few decades, which is exactly what CAFE standards were designed to do. However, 
while these changes reduced the gasoline consumption in the US, they also reduced the 
gasoline tax revenue. In chapter four and five, I studied the household survey data and 
simulated how the tax revenue would further drop as overall fleet fuel economy further 
improves. My simulations also show that a VMT tax, which would tax people based on 
the distance they drive instead of on their gasoline consumption, would remove this 
negative financial impact of CAFE standards. The VMT tax has previously been 
criticized for putting privacy into risk and providing negative incentives for using 
efficient vehicles. However, my study showed that if we take into account that vehicles 
are getting more efficient, the VMT tax would actually be a better tool, not just in 
providing more stable tax revenue, but also in pricing the cost of driving. Raising the 
gasoline tax had been considered as the best approach for pricing the cost of driving in 
previous studies because it prices pollution, which is the major externality of driving, 
directly. However, as fleet fuel economy increases, the cost of pollution would take 
smaller part in the total externalities of driving, while the cost of congestion and 
accidents become more important. These externalities are all directly related to the usage 
of roads, which is what a VMT tax is based on. There could be high transition costs in the 
short run if the government decided to replace the gasoline tax with the VMT tax. But in 
the long run, the VMT tax could serve as an effective tool to mitigate the negative 
impacts of a stringent CAFE standard and to better internalize the cost of driving in the 
US. 
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 As a milestone performance based regulation, the CAFE standard has been 
controversial in the past. My thesis looks into its impacts and introduced tools to predict 
its future impacts as the stringency of the regulation changes. These methods can be 
applied to performance base regulations in other industries. I also discussed the benefit of 
a VMT tax that could mitigate the long term effect of CAFE standards on the 
transportation sector. My simulation methods and results could be useful references for 
policy makers in designing future tax structures to better manage road usage in the US.  
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APPENDIX 
 
DATA CONSTRUCTION OF THE 2009 NHTS DATA 
 
In what follows I provide an overview of each of the data I used in chapter four 
and five and discuss the construction of the sample used in the analysis and provide 
detailed cleaning procedures and detail the precise construction of several of the key 
variables. 
 
I. Data summary and construction of the household vehicle sample 
 
For several decades, the US DOT Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has 
conducted the National Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) with two most recent 
surveys occurring in 1990 and 1995.  In more recent years, the NPTS was supplanted by 
the more comprehensive National Household Transportation Survey, which has been 
conducted twice in 2001 and 2009. The NHTS/NPTS data include information on travel 
demand as well as socio-demographic for sampled households. A RDD sampling 
procedure was used to initially select the national sample of household participants, as 
well to conduct follow-up household and personal phone surveys for the national sample. 
In addition, since the 1990 NPTS, additional ‘add-on’ surveys were conducted in certain 
regions by request. The publicly available NHTS data of 2009 contains 3 major files, the 
household file, which records household information and regional information, the 
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individual file, which records information of individual household members, and the 
vehicle file, which records individual vehicles. There are a total of 25,510 national 
households and 124,637 add-on program households recorded in the published 2009 
NHTS data. 
Households that claim to own vehicles were also asked to provide information of 
their vehicles and the usage of each vehicle. Vehicle type, vehicle make, vehicle model, 
and vehicle model year are reported using the US DOT National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration coding system in the NHTS data. Using the NHTSA codes, I merged 
additional vehicle attribute information that were primarily collected from WAY, which 
includes data for mode years 1971-2011, and which was supplemented with information 
from the AC, which includes attribute data for model years 1945-2013. A detailed 
discussion of these data, including their advantages and disadvantages, is provided in 
Section II below.27 Despite my best efforts, in some cases I was unable to match some of 
the vehicles in the 2009 NHTS data with the WAY and AC datasets because of missing 
or incorrectly coded vehicle make, model, and/or year. I managed to match 91.9 percent 
of the vehicles in the 2009 NHTS data with vehicle attribute data. 
Next I discuss the edits I performed to the NHTS data to construct the sample. I 
made four waves of edits in data merging. These changes to the sample were tracked 
across two dimensions, households and vehicles. The first edit I performed was to handle 
unmatched vehicles, which as I lack vehicle attribute data for these vehicles, could not be 
used in my analysis. I adopted a conservative approach that attempts to save as many 
                                                     
27 I focus my analysis on passenger vehicles, which include two categories, passenger cars with 
NHTSA model codes from 1-399 and light duty trucks with model codes from 401-699.  
Motorcycles, farm vehicles, recreation vehicles, commercial trucks and other unknown vehicles 
are all excluded from the analysis. 
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households as possible without potentially biasing my analysis. First, I dropped 
households that had unmatched vehicles with missing or implausible adjusted annual 
VMT28 (i.e. annual adjusted VMT that is fewer than 100 miles or greater than 60,000 
miles). These households were dropped because their VMT information were unreliable.  
What remained after this cut were households with plausible VMT information (e.g. 
VMT greater than 101 miles and less than 60,000 miles), including households where the 
unmatched vehicles corresponded to a large proportion of household VMT. The 
unmatched vehicles that are frequently used could bias the results and thus I dropped 
households that have unmatched vehicles with VMT between 1,001 and 60,000 miles.  
For the remaining subset of households that have unmatched vehicles with VMT between 
100 and 1,000 miles, which suggested that the unmatched vehicle was not the principal 
vehicle used by the household, I removed the vehicle but keep the household. As shown 
in Table I, removal one of households, this corresponds to the removal of 15,764 
households. In addition, as shown in removal one of vehicles, I removed 21,334 vehicles. 
Out of the removed vehicles, 2,947 vehicles had VMT between 100 and 1,000 miles and 
the household was kept. 
The final three edits applied to all households and reflect the case where key 
vehicle information were unreliable or missing. As for unmatched vehicles, I also 
dropped households that had matched vehicles with adjusted annual VMT that were 
either missing or implausible (e.g. adjusted annual VMT that is less than 100 miles or 
more than 60,000 miles). This corresponds to the removal 5,493 households (removal 
two in row four). Second, I dropped the household if it reported an average annual VMT 
                                                     
28 The construction of annual VMT will be discussed in detail in the variable construction 
section. 
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per driver in excess of 60,000 miles. Annual VMT per driver is simply the sum of the 
adjusted annual VMT of all passenger vehicles that are kept in each household divided by 
the reported number of drivers in the household. This corresponded to the removal of 77 
households (removal three in row five). After applying these edits, the constructed 
sample contains 128,811 households and 224,326 vehicles. 
 
Table I. 2009 NHTS sample construction steps. 
Households   
Total number of households in starting sample 150147 
  
Total households removed -21336 
      Removal one -15764 
      Removal two -5493 
      Removal three -77 
      Removal four -2 
Total removals as % of starting sample -14.2% 
  
Total number of households in constructed sample 128811 
  
Vehicles   
Total number of passenger vehicles before removals 279783 
  
Total vehicles removed -55452 
      Removal one -41881 
            Removals from dropped households -39539 
            Removals from kept households -2342 
      Removal two -13341 
      Removal three -235 
Total removals as % of final sample before removals 19.8% 
  
Total number of vehicles in constructed sample 224326 
 
In my thesis, I further removed households that did not own vehicle and 
observations that had missing information in socio-demographic variables from the 
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constructed sample. These observations could not be used in the regression analysis in 
chapter four and five. The final sample contains 207,382 vehicles and 94,645 households.  
 
II. Variable Construction 
 
Vehicle miles travelled 
 
Annual Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) is a key variable in my analysis. I used 
the self-reported annual VMT (“annmiles”) from the NHTS data. I considered the VMT 
numbers implausible if self-reported VMT was fewer than 100 miles or greater than 
60,000 miles. I used the alternative estimates of VMT reported in the 2009 NHTS data if 
the self-reported VMT was missing or implausible.  In these instances, I used the 
“bestmile” variable reported the data instead of the self-reported VMT. The “bestmile” 
variable was constructed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) using available 
information in the surveys such as household travel behavior and odometer readings. The 
final combined variable is the adjusted annual VMT. As stated in the previous section, 
households were dropped if the adjusted annual VMT was also implausible given the 
same criterion provided here.  
 
Household income 
 
I used the median of each income category that is not top coded, for example, 
$7,500 for households with income reported as between $5,000-$9,999. For top coded 
 102 
 
income households, I used the boundary, which was $100,000 in 2009 NHTS. These 
values were used to run statistics in data validation. I treated income as a categorical 
variable in my analysis in chapter four and five. 
 
Race of household respondent 
 
The 2009 NHTS recorded the race of household respondents into eight categories.  
To provide more consistent comparisons with other studies, I collapsed race into four 
categories, white, black, Asian, and other races.   
 
Miles per gallon (MPG) 
 
Fuel economy is also a key variable in my analysis. As discussed in chapter four, 
I first adjusted the MPG rating in the AC data and the WAY data so that they were 
comparable to each other. I then merged the combined vehicle attribute data and match 
the vehicle models with individual vehicles reported in the 2009 NHTS data. 
 
 
III. Sample Validation 
 
 In this section, I performed a comprehensive comparison of the constructed 
sample. Tables II through VIII compared the socio-demographics and vehicle summary 
statistics between households kept and households dropped. 
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Table II. Vehicle composition comparison. 
 
 
 
 
Table III. Comparison of vehicle composition. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total Number of Households 128,811 21,336 
Total Matched Passenger Vehicles 224,326 32,850 
      
Total Small/Medium Cars 93,319 12,680 
% of matched passenger vehicles  41.60% 38.60% 
      
Total Large Cars 21,207 2,891 
% of total passenger vehicles  9.45% 8.80% 
      
Total Pickups/Vans 61,764 10,170 
% of matched passenger vehicles  27.53% 30.96% 
      
SUV/CUV 48,036 7,109 
% of matched passenger vehicles  21.41% 21.64% 
   
  T-score 
Small/medium cars -6.5 
Large cars -1.16 
Pickups/vans 6.95 
SUV/CUV 0.44 
 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
Total passenger vehicles 224,326 52,510 
   
Total number of cars 114,526 29,745 
% of passenger vehicles 51.05% 56.65% 
   
Total number of light trucks 109,800 22,765 
% of passenger vehicles 48.95% 43.35% 
   
  T-score 
Cars 17.31 
Light trucks -15.47 
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Tables II and III compare the average composition of the passenger vehicle fleet 
for households kept and households dropped. As shown in Table II, the percentage of 
cars to all passenger vehicles is lower in households kept than in households dropped in 
the 2009 NHTS (51.1 percent versus 56.6 percent). These differences are statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. 
In Table III, I compared various vehicle categories for passenger vehicles that 
were successfully matched to the WAY and AC datasets. There are statistically 
significant differences at the 5 percent level in small/medium cars, with more 
small/medium cars in the kept than the dropped samples. Likewise, pickups and vans are 
overrepresented in the dropped households.   
  
Table IV. Comparison of VMT, MPG, and income between households. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
      
Total vehicles with valid VMT 224,326 45,267 
Mean VMT 9,905 10,275 
Std. 8159 9053 
      
Total vehicles with MPG 224,136 32,776 
Mean MPG 23.1 22.5 
Std. 5.5 5.5 
      
Total households with income 118,600 19,338 
Mean Income 55,163 58,449 
Std. 31,968 31,776 
   
  T-score 
VMT 0.03 
MPG -0.074 
Income 0.073 
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Table IV compares the adjusted annual VMT, MPG, and imputed household 
income for both kept and dropped households. T-tests show that there is no significant 
difference between households kept and households dropped in all these variables. As 
these variables are central to my analysis, the finding of no statistically significant 
difference between samples for these variables is critical. 
 
Table V. Comparison of sex, age and race of household respondents. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
      
Male household respondent 51,176 6,550 
% male household respondent 39.70% 30.70% 
Female household respondent 76,901 12,929 
% female household respondent 59.70% 60.60% 
Sex unknown 734 1,857 
      
Mean age of household respondent 58.7 56.7 
Std. 15.5 15.6 
Age unknown 734 1,857 
      
White household respondent 110,391 16,481 
% of white household respondent 85.70% 77.20% 
Black household respondent 7,904 1,233 
% of black household respondent 6.10% 5.80% 
Asian household respondent 2,414 339 
% of Asian household respondent 1.90% 1.60% 
Other races 8,102 3,283 
% of other race household respondent 6.30% 15.40% 
Race unknown 0 0 
   
  T-score 
Male household respondent -14.82 
Female household respondent 1.94 
Age of household respondent 0.06 
White household respondent -24.64 
Black household respondent -0.5 
Asian household respondent -0.39 
Other race household respondent 13.28 
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Table V compares the age, gender, and race of the household respondent between 
households dropped and households kept. The t-tests show that in the 2009 NHTS, there 
are significantly fewer male household respondents in dropped households (30.7 percent 
compared to 39.7 percent in kept households). I found no significant difference in age of 
household respondent.  In the race comparison, I found significantly fewer white 
household respondents in households dropped (43.4 percent versus 48.9 percent in 
households kept). Also, in the 2009 NHTS, ‘other’ races are significantly greater in 
dropped households (15.4 percent versus 6.3 percent in kept households).   
 
Table VI. Comparison of highest education in households. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
      
Less than high school 6,976 1,227 
% less than high school 5.40% 5.80% 
High school 27,369 4,644 
% high school 21.20% 21.80% 
Some college 35,933 6,188 
% Some college 27.90% 29.00% 
Bachelor 29,892 4,927 
% Bachelor 23.20% 23.10% 
Graduate school or more 28,331 4,258 
% graduate school or more 22.00% 20.00% 
Education unknown 310 92 
   
  T-score 
Less than high school 0.47 
High school 0.8 
Some college 1.76 
Bachelor -0.17 
Graduate school or more -3.08 
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Table VI compares the highest education level attained by any member of a 
household between dropped and kept households. T-tests suggest that there were fewer 
households with highest education level attained being “graduate school or more” in 
households dropped in the 2009 NHTS (20 percent versus 22 percent in households kept).  
In these cases the differences are not substantial in magnitude, although they are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
 
Table VII. Summary statistics of life cycle in households. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
1 adult no child 14,095 1,043 
% of 1 adult no child 10.90% 4.90% 
2+ adult no child 25,981 5,494 
% of 2+ adult no child 20.20% 25.80% 
1 adult youngest child age 0-5 554 56 
% of 1 adult youngest child age 0-5 0.40% 0.30% 
2+ adult youngest child age 0-5 10,666 2,271 
% of 2+ adult youngest child age 0-5 8.30% 10.60% 
1 adult youngest child age 6-15 1,869 168 
% of 1 adult youngest child age 6-15 1.50% 0.80% 
2+ adult youngest child age 6-15 13,827 2,999 
% of 2+ adult youngest child age 6-15 10.70% 14.10% 
1 adult youngest child age 16-21 995 144 
% of 1 adult youngest child age 16-21 0.80% 0.70% 
2+ adult youngest child age 16-21 5,162 1,464 
% of 2+ adult youngest child age 16-21 4.00% 6.90% 
1 retired adult no child 19,189 1,324 
% of 1 retired adult no child 14.90% 6.20% 
2+ retired adult no child 36,473 6,373 
% of 2+ retired adult no child 28.30% 29.90% 
Unknown 0 0 
 
Table VII compares the life cycle of households for dropped and kept households.  
Table VIII compares the number of children, seniors, and workers in the household. In 
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both tables, the standard deviations are so large for all comparisons that there is no 
necessity to report the t-test statistics as I found no meaningful difference between 
dropped and kept households in most variables.   
 
Table VIII. Summary statistics of number of children, seniors and workers. 
  Kept Dropped 
Total number of households 128,811 21,336 
      
Number of Children Aged 5-16 0.27 0.32 
Std. 0.68 0.74 
Number of Children Aged 17-21 0.07 0.11 
Std. 0.29 0.36 
Number of workers 0.9 1.06 
Std. 0.88 0.93 
Number of seniors (>=65) 0.58 0.51 
Std. 0.75 0.74 
 
 
IV. Merging in Vehicle Attributes Data 
 
As discussed in Section II, both the WAY and AC datasets have advantages and 
disadvantages. For the purpose of my studies, the WAY data is preferred to the AC data, 
except for vehicles before 1979. For each make-model-year reflected in the NHTSA code 
reported in the NHTS data, I assigned the basic trim from WAY to each vehicle.  Basic 
trim is defined as the trim with the most basic settings in all settings available in a given 
make-model-year. For example, WAY report two trims of 1997 Acura CL, 2.2 CL and 
3.0 CL. I picked 2.2 CL to represent the 1997 Acura CL. In the WAY and the AC data, 
the basic trim is normally the first trim of the model in each model year, with a less 
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powerful engine and low manufacture suggested retail price (MSRP). When a make-
model-year was not available in the WAY data or was missing key information in the 
WAY dataset, such as MPG, I used data from AC instead.  
Vehicle model year was self-reported in the NHTS/NPTS data. In examining the 
data, it became clear that some households confused the year they purchased their vehicle 
with the model year of the vehicle. As such, I made adjustments to correct for this error.  
For households that reported a vehicle as having a model year that was one year 
preceding the first year the model was offered, I recoded the self-reported model year to 
the first year the model was offered. For example, the first available model year of the 
Toyota Venza was 2009. Some households reported having a 2008 Toyota Venza, which 
were recoded to 2009.  
I was also constrained by the way model year was coded for older vehicles in the 
NHTS data. For example, in the 2009 NHTS, all vehicles with model years prior to 1985 
(1923 to 1984) were assigned a model year of 1974. Given that it was more likely for a 
newer vehicle to survive till the time of the survey, I first assigned these vehicles as being 
of the 1984 model class. If by 1984, that model had not yet emerged (or had expired), I 
then assigned that vehicle to the 1983 model class for that model. I repeated this 
recursively until 1975. I stopped at 1975, which was ten years prior to 1984. I did not go 
past 1975 because the survival probability for pre 1975 vintage vehicles was very low at 
2009.  
For light trucks of model year 1991 and before, the model names were often too 
brief for me to match conclusively. For example, Chevrolet C, K, R, and V-series pickups 
all shared a single model code of 481 in the NHTSA coding system while there were 16 
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different models in the WAY and AC data. To recover as much information as possible 
for the light truck fleet prior to 1992, I attempted a best guess so that I could include 
these vehicles in the constructed data. Assuming that make-model-year were accurate for 
these vehicles, I attempted to match the model for these vehicles to other truck attribute 
data included in the WAY and AC datasets. For example, if a 1971 Ford truck was coded 
as being an ‘unknown light truck’, when the WAY and AC data reported that only Ford 
Broncos was made in that year, I classified the vehicle as being a 1971 Ford Bronco. In 
another instance, the later year GMC Savana truck shared the same NHTSA code as the 
earlier year GMC Vandura. Consequently, given the appropriate NHTSA codes and 
reported model year, I assigned the truck as being a Savana or a Vandura. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
